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ABSTRACT
Complex networks appear in almost every aspect of our daily life and are widely studied
in the fields of physics, mathematics, finance, biology and computer science. This work
utilizes percolation theory in statistical physics to explore the percolation properties of
complex networks and develops a reinforcement scheme on improving network resilience.
This dissertation covers two major parts of my Ph.D. research on complex networks: i)
probe—in the context of both traditional percolation and k-core percolation—the resilience
of complex networks with tunable degree distributions or directed dependency links under
random, localized or targeted attacks; ii) develop and propose a reinforcement scheme to
eradicate catastrophic collapses that occur very often in interdependent networks.
We first use generating function and probabilistic methods to obtain analytical solutions
to percolation properties of interest, such as the giant component size and the critical
occupation probability. We study uncorrelated random networks with Poisson, bi-Poisson,
power-law, and Kronecker-delta degree distributions and construct those networks which
are based on the configuration model. The computer simulation results show remarkable
agreement with theoretical predictions.
We discover an increase of network robustness as the degree distribution broadens and a
decrease of network robustness as directed dependency links come into play under random
attacks. We also find that targeted attacks exert the biggest damage to the structure of both
single and interdependent networks in k-core percolation. To strengthen the resilience of
interdependent networks, we develop and propose a reinforcement strategy and obtain the
vii
critical amount of reinforced nodes analytically for interdependent Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks
and numerically for scale-free and for random regular networks. Our mechanism leads to
improvement of network stability of the West U.S. power grid.
This dissertation provides us with a deeper understanding of the effects of structural
features on network stability and fresher insights into designing resilient interdependent
infrastructure networks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Complex Networks and Graph Theory
Complex networks are ubiquitous in our daily life and have attracted tremendous attention
and interest from many disciplines including sociology, physics, biology, economic, opera-
tions research and computer science [1–21]. A network is a set of items (called nodes or
vertices) with connections (called edges or links). Nodes represent the fundamental system
entities and links represent the relationship between those entities. During the last two
decades, complex networks have been widely used as models to understand many features
of complex systems, such as structure, stability and function [21]. Systems take the form of
complex networks include social media, the infrastructures, global trading systems, financial
networks, and many others. For example, the sum of professional, friendship and family
relations between individuals forms the fabric of the social networks [22]. The power plants
and transmission lines form a power grid network, in which two nodes representing two
power plants are connected through the wires [23]. Similarly, airports and flights form an
airline network, in which two nodes representing two airports are connected when an airline
exists between these two airports [24]. Likely, international trade in the form of imports
and exports has brought countries together to form a huge and complex trade network [25].
Countries tied through trade are concurrently linked through the banking networks as well.
The study of networks uses ideas from graph theory to describe mathematical concepts
1
2in networks [8, 21]. Initially graph theory was introduced by Euler to solve the long-standing
problem of the bridges of Ko¨nigsberg, in which people were asked to find a path to traverse
all seven bridges without passing any of them twice. Euler’s proof was the first time graph
was used to solve a mathematical problem. Graphs represent the fundamental topological
properties of a network by treating the network as a collection of nodes and links. A network
is called directed if all of its links are directed; it is called undirected if all of its links are
undirected. The number of links attached to a node is called its degree. The degrees of
all the nodes form a degree distribution of the network. Before 1960, the work on graph
theory mainly dealt with the properties of special individual graphs. In the 1960s, two
Hungarian mathematicians, Paul Erdo˝s and Afred Re´nyi introduced the first probability
model of networks-random graph model, in which N labeled nodes are connected with L
randomly placed links [26, 27]. Their model focused on the study of a statistical ensemble of
graphs and led to ideas very similar to those of statistical physics. Concepts like percolation,
scaling, order parameters, phase transitions, and critical exponents from statistical physics
are all present in the field of random graphs in the thermodynamic limit N → 0, and are
used in the study of complex networks.
1.1.1 Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) Networks
The ER has been traditionally the dominant subject of study in the field of random graphs.
Usually the number of nodes in the networks are expressed with N and degree of a given
node is expressed with k. A quantity of immediate interest is the average degree 〈k〉, which
represents the average number of links connected to nodes in the whole network. A well-
known result for the ER networks is that the degree distribution, which is expressed with
P (k), follows a Poisson distribution,
P (k) = e−〈k〉〈k〉k/k! (1.1)
The characteristic of an ER network is that most of the nodes have about the same number
of degrees around average degree 〈k〉 [26, 27].
31.1.2 Scale-free (SF) Networks
With the development of technology and the availability of more large-scale data, it is
revealed that for many real-world systems, ER model fails to describe their properties.
Direct measurement of the degree distribution for real networks, such as the Internet [5, 28],
WWW [29], e-mail networks [30], citations of scientific articles [31], neuronal networks [32]
and many more, show that Poisson distribution no longer applies. Instead, in 1999, Baraba´si
investigated several real-world networks and found that their degree distributions follow
power-law distribution [33],
P (k) = ck−γ , k = m, ...,K, (1.2)
where c ≈ (γ − 1)mγ−1 is a normalization factor, and m and K are the lower and upper
cutoffs for the degree of a node. Since this type of power-law distribution do not have typical
scale of degree, it is coined as the distribution of scale-free (SF) network. Constant γ is
called the power law exponent for a network, and usually lies between 2 and 3. The most
prominent property of the SF network is the heterogeneity of the degrees of nodes, of which
most have very low degrees while a few have very high degrees. Moreover, the divergence of
moments higher than (γ−1) is responsible for many of the anomalous properties attributed
to SF network.
It is worth noting that degree distribution alone does not fully characterize the struc-
ture of a network. There are other quantities, such as centrality, closeness, maximum flow,
degree-degree correlation, and clustering coefficients to finer describe the structural prop-
erties of a network.
1.2 Generating Function and Percolation Models
1.2.1 Generating Function Method
A network generally consists of many components, small and large, where each component is
a group of nodes connected internally, but disconnected from other components. Essentially
4there exists a path between any two nodes in a component, but no path exists between nodes
in different components. The biggest component of them, called the giant component or
giant cluster, normally is of size proportional to the size of the entire network. Generating
function method is a very powerful and commonly used technique to describe random
graphs with arbitrary degree distributions, including the existence and the size of the giant
component in the network. Newman, Watts and Strogatz comprehensively developed this
approach to study the structural properties of complex networks [3, 8]. Here we introduce
the results that we will use in this study.
For an undirected graph of N nodes, we define its degree distribution as P(k), then the
generating function of the degree distribution is
G0(x) =
∑
k
P (k)xk, (1.3)
where the probability is given by the kth derivative of G0(x) with respect to x at x = 0.
The probability of reaching a node with degreek by following a specific link is kP (k)/〈k〉,
and the corresponding generating function of those probabilities is :
G1(x) =
∑
k
P (k)k
〈k〉 x
k−1 =
G
′
0(x)
G
′
0(1)
. (1.4)
Likely, the size distribution of the components that can be reached from a randomly
chosen link is generated in a self-consistent
H1(x) = xG1(H1(x)). (1.5)
Then the size distribution of the clusters that can be traversed by randomly following a
starting vertex is generated by
H0(x) = xG0(H1(x)). (1.6)
And the size of the giant component is given by P∞=1−H0(1).
1.2.2 Percolation Models
Percolation theory is a highly developed sub-field of statistical physics and mathematics. It
typically addresses phase transition problems in grids and other organized lattices of various
5dimensions. Starting out with an empty lattice, the percolation model assumes that sites
(nodes) or bonds (links) in the lattice are later occupied with some probability p, where
neighboring occupied sites or bonds are connected to form clusters of size two or more. If p
is small, all clusters are finite; if p approaches a critical value pc, these small clusters grow
and coalesce, leading to the emergence of a large cluster. We call it the percolating cluster if
it contains a path from one side of the lattice to the other. The percolation phase transition
occurs at pc, which is dependent on the type and dimension of the lattice. Quantities such
as average cluster size, order parameter and correlation length are used to quantify the
nature of phase transition. For complex networks, the ideas of percolation theory can still
be applied to obtain useful results, but usually in a way of inverse percolation starting from
a fully occupied network. The other difference is that instead of using a spanning cluster
that spans over the whole lattice, we now use a giant component as the order parameter,
to characterize the condition of percolation. The existence of a giant component above
the percolation threshold pc and its absence below the threshold pc signify the percolation
property of a network.
The phenomenon of primary interest in robustness is the impact of node failures on the
integrity of a network, which can be well characterized by a percolation model. We assume
that only nodes belonging to the giant component are functional in the network. When
some nodes in the network are attacked and removed, other nodes that are connected to
the network through those nodes will also be disconnected. If the attack is not severe, the
missing nodes do little damage to the network. However, increasing the severity of the
attack, can isolate chunks of nodes from the giant component and the entire network might
break into tiny disconnected components. This fragmentation process is characterized by a
critical threshold below which a giant component exists in the network (thus the network
is functional), and above which the network will fully disintegrate. The robustness of the
network under attacks depends crucially on the nature of the attack and the structure of
the network.
(I) Random Attack (RA): For example, the attack could be random, which means an
6initial attack with the random removal of a fraction 1−p of nodes from the network, and the
cluster size distribution of the remaining network will change. Specifically, the generating
functions of the surviving clusters’ size distribution are [3]
H1(x) = 1− p+ pxG1(H1(x)), (1.7)
and analogously,
H0(x) = 1− p+ pxG0(H1(x)). (1.8)
Now pc, the critical value at which the giant component collapses, is determined by the
following equation
pc =
1
G
′
1(1)
. (1.9)
(II) Targeted Attack (TA): Random attack has been the dominant topic of study on
network robustness in the past decade. However, when we consider real scenarios, initial
failures are mostly not random. It may be due to a targeted attack on important central
nodes. Indeed, it was shown that targeted attacks on high degree nodes or high betweenness
nodes in single networks have dramatic effect on their robustness [34, 35]. Specifically a value
Wα(ki) is assigned to each node, which represents the probability that a node i with ki links
is initially attacked and becomes inactive. We focus on the family of functions [7]
Wα(ki) =
kαi∑N
i=1 k
α
i
,−∞ < α < +∞. (1.10)
When α > 0 nodes with a higher connectivity have a higher probability of being removed,
and when α < 0 the opposite is true. Note that when α = 0 all nodes have an equal
probability of being removed, which is identical to the random attack case. An important
special case α = 1 corresponds to the acquaintance immunization strategy [36]. A fraction
1− p of nodes are removed according to the associated value Wα(ki) of each node. Using a
mapping method which we will describe in the remainder of the thesis, we can transform a
TA on a random network to an RA on an equivalent random network.
(II) Localized Attack (LA): While targeted attack can address scenarios where attacks are
carried out intentionally on hub nodes or high betweenness nodes, more recently Shuai Shao
7etc developed a framework to study those scenarios where node failures predominantly occur
in a local region but with global effect on the whole network [37]. More specifically, they
considered the initial removal of a fraction 1− p of nodes locally, starting with a randomly
chosen seed node. In this case one removes this seed node and its nearest neighbors, next
nearest neighbors etc. until a fraction 1 − p of nodes are removed from the network. This
kind of attack may be realistic in cases such as earthquakes or in cases of weapons of mass
destruction. The localized attack can be separated into two stages: (i) at the first stage
nodes belonging to the attacked area (the seed node and the layers surrounding it) are
removed but the links connecting them to the remaining nodes of the network are kept; (ii)
at the second stage, these links are also removed. Like targeted attack, a mapping method
is employed to transform a LA on a random network to an RA on an equivalent network.
(IV) k-core percolatioin An emerging generalization of the ordinary percolation is k-
core percolation in which the behavior of the k-core characterizes the structural changes
that occur when a network is under any types of initial attacks listed above [38–40]. The
k-core of a network is defined as the largest subgraph in which each node has at least k
neighbors. After initial node removal, the k-core is obtained through a pruning process in
which nodes of degree less than k are progressively removed, which is also the called the
k-core percolation process. When k = 1, k-cores are connected components in the network
and the giant k-core is the giant connected component, the same as in ordinary percolation.
When k = 2 there is again a continuous transition similar to that in ordinary percolation,
and the 2-core is obtained by pruning all dangling branches from the 1-core [38, 41]. In
k-core percolation with k ≥ 3, single networks demonstrate discontinuous transitions at a
k-dependent critical threshold pc(k) [38–40]. We will describe how each type of initial attack
will influence the network robustness in the context of k-core percolation in the remainder
of the thesis.
81.3 Interdependent Networks
Before 2010, almost all work done on network research has concentrated on the limited case
of a single network which does not interact with other networks. However, in nature and
in many artificial infrastructures, networks rarely appear in isolation. They are typically
elements of larger systems and have non-trivial effects on each other. For example, infras-
tructure systems exhibit inter-dependency to a large degree. The power stations which form
the nodes of power grid depend on the communications network to function properly and
vice versa. In 2010, Buldyrev etc firstly proposed a mathematical framework to study the
robustness of interdependent networks [10]. This mathematical framework forms the basis
of the theoretical research on interdependent networks in this thesis.
The interdependent networks model consists of two networks A and B, and assume
that the functioning of a node in network A depends on the ability of one or more nodes
in network B to supply a critical resource to the node in network A. Similarly, a node
in network B depends on a set of nodes in network A. The networks can be connected
in different ways; in the most general configuration one could specify the distributions of
connections between the nodes from both networks. The networks can have the same, or
different, typologies. The model can easily be extended to an arbitrary number of interacting
networks each with its own specific topology and dependence on the other networks.
We apply the percolation theory by randomly removing a fraction 1−p of nodes and their
links within network A and all the nodes in network B that are dependent on the removed
nodes in network A are also removed along with their connectivity links. As nodes and links
are sequentially removed, each network begins breaking down into disconnected components.
Due to inter-dependency, the removal process iterates back and forth between these two
networks until they completely fragment or reach a mutually connected giant component
with no further disintegration. As in Ref. [10] we introduce the function gA(p) = 1−GA0[1−
p(1− fA)] which is the fraction of nodes that belong to the giant component of network A,
where fA is a function of p that satisfies the transcendental equation fA = GA1[1−p(1−fA)].
9Similar equations exist for network B. After the system of the interdependent networks
stops disintegrating, the fraction of nodes in the mutual giant component is P∞, satisfying
P∞ = xgB(x) = ygA(y), (1.11)
where x and y satisfy
x = pgA(y), y = pgB(x). (1.12)
Excluding the trivial solution x = 0, y = 0 of the equation set above, we can combine
them into a single equation by substitution and obtain,
x = gA[gB(x)p]p. (1.13)
A nontrivial solution emerges in the critical case (x = xc, p = pc) by equating the derivatives
of both sides of Eq. (1.13) with respect to x
1 = p2
dgA[pgB(x)]
dx
dgB(x)
dx
x=xc,p=pc (1.14)
which, together with Eq. (1.12), gives the solution for pc and the critical size of the mutually
connected component, P∞(pc) = xcgB(xc).
1.4 Self-consistent Probabilistic Method
A powerful technique that is based on self-consistent probabilities can be applied to a
wide variety of networks with minimum simplicity by skipping the recursive mapping of
percolation process in each stage of cascading failures in interdependent networks [42]. The
method focuses on the the recursive representation of two central quantities, defined as the
probabilities of finding a link/node in the giant component.
1.4.1 Single Network
For a single random network A, we assume its degree distribution PA(k) fully captures its
structural property. We start by defining a key quantity x, which is the probability to
reach the functioning component by following a randomly chosen link to one of its ends
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A
x
r
∞
Figure 1.1: Definition of x. A link (red) is chosen and a node r (green) is found. From
the three outgoing links (dashed lines) of node r, one of them leads to the giant component
(represented by∞). Since at least one of the three outgoing links of r leads to the function-
ing component, the red link leads to the giant component. Thus we define the probability
of finding such a red link as x.
(see Fig. 1.1 for illustration). It will be similarly defined throughout this work and plays a
central role in the mathematical analysis.
Suppose we randomly choose a link in network A, and find an arbitrary node r by
following this link in an arbitrary direction. The probability that node r has degree k is
PA(k)k∑
k PA(k)k
=
PA(k)k
〈kA〉 . (1.15)
For node r to be part of the functioning component, at least one of its other k− 1 outgoing
links (other than the link first chosen) leads to the giant component. By calculating this
probability, we can write out the self-consistent equation [42–47] for x
x =
∑
k
PA(k)k
〈kA〉
[
1− (1− x)k−1
]
= 1−GA1(1− x). (1.16)
Therefore, for a randomly chosen node r, the probability that it is in the giant component
is determined by one of the following conditions: at least one of its k links leads to the giant
component. Thus we define this probability as P∞ [42–47] and obtain the expression of it
as
P∞ =
∑
k
PA(k)
[
1− (1− x)k
]
= 1−GA0(1− x). (1.17)
Further, in the network percolation problem, when a fraction 1−p of nodes are removed
at random initially from the network, i.e., there is a fraction p nodes remaining, we could
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apply the above equations with slight modifications. Assuming that the links of the removed
nodes are still present on the network, the probability that a randomly selected link leads
to the functioning component is the same as before. But since only a fraction p of the nodes
remain in the network, by calculating the probability that the randomly chosen link leads to
the functioning component, the self-consistent equation [44, 47] of x in Eq. (1.16) becomes
x = p
∑
k
PA(k)k
〈kA〉
[
1− (1− x)k−1
]
= p [1−GA1(1− x)] . (1.18)
Similarly, the probability that a randomly chosen node is in the functioning component
[42–47] is
P∞ = p [1−GA0(1− x)] . (1.19)
It is shown that in a single network, when p→ pc, we have x→ 0. Thus, by taking the
Taylor expansion of Eq. (1.18), we obtain pc =
1
G
′
1(1)
.
1.4.2 Interdependent Networks
For a system of two fully interdependent networks A and B, we denote x (y) as the prob-
ability that a randomly chosen link in network A (B) reaches the functioning component
of network A (B). In the defined mutually connected giant component (MCGC) after the
cascading failings, every node in the giant component is connected via the connectivity links
in its own network, and its dependent node is in the giant component of the other network
as well. By calculating the probability of a randomly chosen link in network A leads to the
MCGC, we would obtain:
x = [1−GA1(1− x)] [1−GB0(1− y)] . (1.20)
Similarly, we would obtain the probability that a randomly chosen link in B leads to the
functioning component of network B as
y = [1−GB1(1− y)] [1−GA0(1− x)] . (1.21)
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Consequently, the probability that a randomly chosen node (either in network A or B) is
in the MCGC is:
PA∞ = [1−GA0(1− x)] [1−GB0(1− y)] . (1.22)
When we randomly remove a fraction 1−p of nodes from network A, there is only a fraction
p of the nodes left in network A. Hence out of the original probability x(y) that a randomly
selected link leads to the MCGC, only a fraction p of nodes are actually remaining. It is
thus easy to write down the new expressions for x and y asx = p [1−GA1(1− x)] [1−GB0(1− y)] ,y = p [1−GB1(1− y)] [1−GA0(1− x)] . (1.23)
These two equations can be transformed into x = F1(p, y) and y = F2(p, x), which can be
solved numerically by iteration with proper initial values of x and y. Finally, we arrive at
the equations for PA∞, which is the probability that a randomly selected node in network A
is in the MCGC:
PA∞ = p [1−GA0(1− x)] [1−GB0(1− y)] . (1.24)
If the system has an abrupt phase transition at p = pIc , F1(p, y) and F2(p, x) satisfy the
condition,
∂F1(p
I
c , y
I)
∂yI
· ∂F2(p
I
c , x
I)
∂xI
= 1, (1.25)
namely, the curves x = F1(p
I
c , y) and y = F2(p
I
c , x) touch each other tangentially at (x
I , yI)
[42].
Chapter 2
How Degree Breadth Influences Network
Robustness: Comparing Random and
Localized Attacks
2.1 Introduction
Complex networks are widely used as models to understand such features of complex systems
as structure, stability, and function [1–3, 5, 8, 13, 21, 23, 48–61]. The robustness of networks
suffering site or link attacks is a topic of great interest because it is an important issue
affecting many real-world networks. Such approaches as site percolation on a network
where nodes suffer either random attack (RA) [1–3] or targeted attack (TA) based on
node connectivity [1, 2] have been developed to study these phenomena. Localized attack
(LA) in which nodes surrounding a seed node are removed layer by layer has also been
recently introduced [37, 62]. In addition, interdependent networks are more vulnerable to
RA and TA than isolated single networks [10, 12, 17–19, 63, 64]. LA on spatially embedded
interdependent networks has been addressed, and a significant metastable regime where LA
above a critical size propagates throughout the whole system has also been found [62].
Although prior research has developed tools for probing network robustness against all
these attack scenarios and has found that degree distribution breadth strongly influences
network stability [5], there has been no systematic study of how degree distribution breadth
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affects robustness. Here we compare LA and RA on two network models in which the
breadth is controlled. One model is bi-Poisson with two groups having different average
degrees. The difference between the two average degrees characterizes the breadth of the
degree distribution of the network. Although research on this topic usually focuses on
a network with a pure Poisson degree distribution, many real-world networks have two
or more degree distributions [65, 66]. For example, a network of two groups of people,
a high-degree group with many friends and a low-degree group with few friends, might
reflect a bi-Poisson distribution. Note that bi-Poissonian networks are optimally robust
against TA [65]. The second model in which the breadth can be controlled is a Gaussian
degree distribution. Here the standard deviation σ characterizes the breadth of the degree
distribution. This distribution is realistic, e.g., the distribution of WWW links resembles a
Gaussian distribution [67].
We here analyze the robustness against attack of networks in which we can tune the
breadth of the degree distributions, e.g., those with bi-Poisson and Gaussian degree dis-
tributions. We limit our approach to LA and RA and use the frameworks developed in
Refs. [3] and [37], extending them to study (i) single networks with a bi-Poisson distribu-
tion, (ii) single networks with a Gaussian distribution, (iii) fully interdependent networks
with the same bi-Poisson distribution in each network, and (iv) fully interdependent net-
works with the same Gaussian distribution in each network. By changing α of the bi-Poisson
distribution
P (k) = αe−λ1
λk1
k!
+ (1− α)e−λ2 λ
k
2
k!
, α ∈ [0, 1], (2.1)
with fixed λ1 and λ2, and σ
2 of the Gaussian distribution,
P (k) = A · exp(−(k − µ)
2
2σ2
), k ≥ 0, (2.2)
with µ fixed, we investigate how the distribution breadth influences the percolation prop-
erties. These include the size of the giant component P∞ as a function of p, the fraction
of unremoved nodes and the critical threshold pc at which the giant component P∞ first
collapses. In all cases we find that our extensive simulations and analytical calculations are
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in agreement, and observe the qualitative characteristics of robustness in both single and
interdependent networks under both LA and RA.
2.2 RA and LA on a Single Network
2.2.1 Theory
Following Ref. [46], we introduce the generating function of the degree distribution P (k) of
a certain network as
G0(x) =
∑
k
P (k)xk. (2.3)
Similarly, for the generating function of the underlying branching processes, we have
G1(x) =
∑
k
P (k)k
〈k〉 x
k−1 =
G
′
0(x)
G
′
0(1)
. (2.4)
The size distribution of the clusters that can be reached from a randomly chosen link is
generated in a self-consistent equation
H1(x) = xG1(H1(x)). (2.5)
Then the size distribution of the clusters that can be traversed by randomly following a
starting vertex is generated by
H0(x) = xG0(H1(x)). (2.6)
Next we distinguish between random attack and localized attack.
(I) Random Attack: An initial attack with the random removal of a fraction 1 − p of
nodes from the network changes the cluster size distribution of the remaining network and
the generating functions of the surviving clusters’ size distribution become [3]
H1(x) = 1− p+ pxG1(H1(x)), (2.7)
and analogously,
H0(x) = 1− p+ pxG0(H1(x)). (2.8)
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Here pc, the critical value at which the giant component collapses, is determined by
pc =
1
G
′
1(1)
, (2.9)
and
pc =
1
G
′
1(1)
=
G
′
0(1)
G
′′
0(1)
, (2.10)
which is equivalent to the expression pc = 〈k〉/〈k(k − 1)〉 given in Ref. [2] and can be recast
into pc =
µ
σ2+µ2−µ with µ = 〈k〉 and σ2 =
〈
k2
〉 − 〈k〉2 as the mean and variance of the
degree distribution respectively.
Thus for a bi-Poisson distribution, because G0(x) = αe
λ1(x−1) + (1− α)eλ2(x−1), pc is
pc =
αλ1 + (1− α)λ2
αλ21 + (1− α)λ22
. (2.11)
For a Gaussian distribution we have
pc =
∑∞
1 ke
(−(k−µ)2/2σ2)∑∞
2 k(k − 1)e(−(k−µ)2/2σ2)
. (2.12)
The size of the resultant giant component is [3]
P∞(p) = 1−H0(1) = p[1−G0(H1(1))], (2.13)
which can be numerically determined by solving H1(1) from its self-consistent equation
H1(1) = 1− p+ pG1(H1(1)). (2.14)
(II) Localized Attack : We next consider the local removal of a fraction 1 − p of nodes,
starting with a randomly chosen seed node. Here we remove the seed node and its nearest
neighbors, next-nearest neighbors, next-next-nearest neighbors, and continue until a fraction
1 − p of nodes have been removed from the network. This pattern of attack reflects such
real-world cases as earthquakes or the use of weapons of mass destruction. As in Ref. [37],
the localized attack occurs in two stages, (i) nodes belonging to the attacked area (the
seed node and the layers surrounding it) are removed but the links connecting them to the
remaining nodes of the network are left in place, but then (ii) these links are also removed.
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Following the method introduced in Refs. [37, 68], we find the generating function of the
degree distribution of the remaining network to be
Gp0(x) =
1
G0(f)
G0[f +
G
′
0(f)
G
′
0(1)
(x− 1)], (2.15)
where f ≡ G−10 (p). The generating function of the underlying branching process is thus
Gp1(x) =
G
′
p0(x)
G
′
p0(1)
. (2.16)
The generating function of the cluster size distribution following a random starting node in
the remaining network is
Hp0(x) = xGp0(Hp1(x)), (2.17)
where Hp1(x), the generating function of the cluster size distribution given by randomly
traversing a link, satisfies the self-consistent condition
Hp1(x) = xGp1(Hp1(x)). (2.18)
The network begins to generate a giant component when G
′
p1(1) = 1 [37], which yields pc
as the solution to
G
′′
0(G
−1
0 (pc)) = G
′
0(1). (2.19)
The size of the giant component P∞(p) as a fraction of the remaining network thus satisfies
[37]
P∞(p) = p [1−Gp0(Hp1(1))] , (2.20)
which can be numerically determined by first solving Hp1(1) from Eq. (2.18), i.e., Hp1(1) =
Gp1(Hp1(1)).
In order to determine pc explicitly, we first get fc from fc ≡ G−10 (pc), i.e., fc from
G0(fc) = pc. Then from Eq. (2.19) fc must also satisfy G
′′
0(fc) = G
′
0(1). In the general
case, pc and P∞ must be obtained by solving numerically Eqs. (2.19) and (2.20). In certain
limiting cases, however, one can derive explicit analytical expressions for pc that yield more
physical insight. An example of a specific case is given in the next subsection.
18
Analytic solution of pc for bi-Poisson distribution with λ2 = 2λ1
For a bi-Poisson distribution, using its generating function and G0(fc) = pc, fc and pc
satisfy the relation
G0(fc) = α[e
(fc−1)]λ1 + (1− α)[e(fc−1)]λ2 = pc. (2.21)
Assuming λ2 = 2λ1, we denote e
λ1(fc−1) = y such that Eq. (2.21) reduces to αy+(1−α)y2 =
pc, which, for α 6= 1, is a quadratic equation of y and its positive solution is
y =
√
α2 + 4pc(1− α)− α
2(1− α) . (2.22)
Plugging fc into Eq. (2.19) we get another quadratic equation of y,
αλ21y + (1− α)λ22y2 = αλ1 + (1− α)λ2, (2.23)
for which the physical solution of y is
y =
√
α2λ41 + 4(1− α)λ22[α(λ1 − λ2) + λ2]− αλ21
2(1− α)λ22
. (2.24)
Because fc = ln(y)/λ1 + 1, to obtain pc we need to equate Eqs. (2.22) and (2.24). Thus we
obtain
pc =
(β − α)(β + 7α)
64(1− α) , (2.25)
where β =
√
α2 + 16(1−α)(2−α)λ1 . We use the relation of λ2 = 2λ1 for simplification. Plugging
α = 0 into Eq. (2.25), we get pc = 1/λ2 as found in Ref. [37]. For α → 1, employing the
L’Hoˆpital rule we also get limα→1 pc = 1/λ1, as found in the pure Poisson distribution
described above.
It is impossible to derive pc explicitly for a Gaussian distribution. Even for a bi-Poisson
distribution, other than special cases such as the one discussed above, deriving pc is also
impossible because it requires solving first fc = G
−1
0 (pc), i.e., fc from Eq. (2.21), which
could be viewed as αyλ1 + (1− α)yλ2 = pc, a polynomial equation of y = e(fc−1). Because
we also consider the cases of λ2 > λ1 > 4 using the Abel-Ruffini theorem, there is no general
algebraic solution to the above equation except in some special cases. Hence we use the
Newton’s method to solve pc and P∞ numerically.
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2.2.2 Results
To test the analytical predictions above we conduct numerical calculations of analytic ex-
pressions, and compare the results with the simulation results on single networks with
degrees following both bi-Poisson distributions and Gaussian distributions under both LA
and RA. All the simulation results are obtained for networks of N = 104 nodes.
Single bi-Poisson networks
Figure 2.1 (a) shows the giant component P∞(p) as a function of the occupation probability
p under LA and RA. Note that pc is larger for LA than for RA. The simulation results agree
with the theoretical results obtained from Eqs. (2.13) and (2.20), and there is second-order
percolation transition behavior in both attack scenarios. Note that when α = 0 or 1, i.e.,
when node degrees follow a pure Poisson distribution as reported in Ref. [37], the networks
have the same critical value of pc under LA and RA and the same dependence of P∞(p) on
p. However when α = 0.7, pc(LA) > pc(RA), indicating that the network is more fragile
under LA than under RA, and that the giant components exhibit different behavior.
Figure 2.1 (b) shows how the breadth of the distribution, tuned by changing α with fixed
λ1 and λ2, influences the robustness of the network under LA and RA. The solid lines are
the numerical results obtained from the Newton’s method and the symbols with error bars
are the simulation results. Note that only when α = 0 and α = 1 does pc(LA) = pc(RA).
In all other cases pc(LA) > pc(RA), indicating that the network is always more vulnerable
under LA than under RA if the degree distribution is bi-Poissonian. Note also that pc(LA)
peaks at α = 0.79.
Figure 2.2 (a) shows how the percolation thresholds pc under LA and RA, change with σ
2
where α ∈ [0, 1] and λ1 = 4 and λ2 = 12. Note that σ2 = (α−α2)(λ1−λ2)2+αλ1+(1−α)λ2,
and as a quadratic function of α, σ2 peaks at 24.25 when α = 0.4375. Here in Fig. 2.2 (a),
as σ2 first increases from 12 (α = 0) to 24.25 (α = 0.4375), pc(LA) and pc(RA) increase
accordingly; then as σ2 begins turning back to decrease to 4 (α = 1), pc(LA) and pc(RA)
behave differently and deviate from their previous trajectories. Namely, for a same σ2 value
20
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1p
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
P ∞
LA
RA
(a)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
α
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
p c
LA
RA
(b)
Figure 2.1: (a) Sizes of giant component, P∞(p), as a function of p for λ1 = 4, λ2 = 12
and α = 0.7. Here solid lines are theoretical predictions, from Eq. (2.13) for RA (red line)
and Eq. (2.20) for LA (green line), and symbols are simulation results with network size
N = 104, where averages are taken over 10 realizations, under LA (©) and RA (). (b)
Percolation thresholds pc of a single bi-Poisson network as a function of α under LA and
RA with λ1 = 4, λ2 = 12. Here solid lines are theoretical predictions, from Eq. (2.11) for
RA (blue line) and Eq. (2.19) for LA (green line) and symbols ( for RA and © for LA)
with error bars are simulation results with network size of N = 104 nodes, where averages
and standard deviations are taken over 20 realizations.
corresponding to two different α values, there are two different pc(LA) and pc(RA) values.
Next we obtain the relationship between the mean and variance of the bi-Poisson dis-
tribution as
σ2
µ
=
(α− α2)(λ1 − λ2)2
αλ1 + (1− α)λ2 + 1 ≥ 1, (2.26)
where the equality holds when α = 0 or 1. We now set α = 0.5 and fix µ = 12(λ1+λ2) = 8 and
gradually increase the difference between λ1 and λ2 to increase σ
2 monotonically. We find
that when the distribution broadens, i.e., when σ2 increases, pc(LA) increases but pc(RA)
decreases (see Fig. 2.2 (b)). Note that when σ2 = µ holds, we have pc(LA) = pc(RA),
otherwise we have pc(LA) > pc(RA).
21
4 8 12 16 20 24
σ
2
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
p c
LA
RA
(a)
8 12 16 20 24
σ
2
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
p c
LA
RA
(b)
Figure 2.2: (a) Percolation thresholds pc of a single bi-Poisson network as a function of σ
2
under LA and RA with α ∈ [0, 1], λ1 = 4 and λ2 = 12. Here solid lines are theoretical
predictions, from Eq. (2.11) for RA (blue line) and Eq. (2.19) for LA (green line) and
symbols ( for RA and © for LA) with error bars are simulation results with network size
ofN = 104 nodes, where averages and standard deviations are taken over 20 realizations. (b)
Percolation thresholds pc as a function of σ
2 of networks with bi-Poisson degree distribution
under LA and RA with α = 0.5 and µ = 8. Here solid lines are theoretical predictions, from
Eq. (2.11) for RA (red line) and Eq. (2.19) for LA (black line) and symbols ( for RA and
© for LA) with error bars are simulation results with network size of N = 104 nodes, where
averages and standard deviations are taken over 20 realizations. It is shown here that as
σ2 increases pc(LA) increases whereas pc(RA) decreases simultaneously and they overlap
at σ2 = µ = 8.
Single Gaussian Networks
Figure 2.3 (a) shows the giant component P∞(p) as a function of the occupation probability
p under LA and RA respectively for a single network with a Gaussian degree distribution.
Note that the simulation results and the theoretical results obtained from Eqs. (2.13) and
(2.20) agree, and that second-order phase transition behavior is present in both attack
scenarios. Note also that µ = 4 and σ2 = 2, and thus pc(LA) < pc(RA), which indicates
that the network is more robust under LA than under RA for this particular distribution.
We fix µ and find that when the Gaussian distribution broadens, i.e., when σ increases,
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Figure 2.3: (a) Sizes of giant component as a function of p of a single Gaussian network
with µ = 4 and σ2 = 2. Here solid lines are theoretical results, from Eq. (2.13) for RA (blue
line) and Eq. (2.20) for LA (green line) and symbols are simulation results obtained from
network size of N = 104 where averages are taken over 10 realizations under LA (©) and
RA (). (b) Percolation thresholds pc as a function of σ2 of networks with Gaussian degree
distribution under LA and RA with µ = 4. Here solid lines are theoretical predictions, from
Eq. (2.12) for RA (red line) and Eq. (2.19) for LA (black line) and symbols ( for RA and
© for LA) with error bars are simulation results with network size of N = 104 nodes, where
averages and standard deviations are taken over 20 realizations. It is shown here that as
σ2 increases pc(LA) increases whereas pc(RA) decreases simultaneously and they intersect
each other around σ2 ≈ µ = 4.
pc(RA) decreases, but that pc(LA) increases with σ (see Fig. 2.3 (b)). Note that when
σ2 < µ, pc(LA) < pc(RA), and that the opposite is true when σ
2 > µ. Note also that when
σ2 ≈ µ there is a crossing point with pc(RA) ≈ pc(LA), which is analogous to a Poisson ER
network with the same mean and variance and the robustness of the network under both
LA and RA is the same, as reported in Ref. [37].
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2.3 RA and LA on Fully Interdependent Networks
2.3.1 Theory
We apply the formalism of RA on fully interdependent networks introduced in Ref. [10].
Specifically, we consider two networks A and B with the same number of nodes N . Within
each network the nodes are randomly connected with degree distributions PA(k) and PB(k)
respectively. Every node in network A depends on a random node in network B, and vice
versa. We also assume that if a node i in network A depends on a node j in network B
and node j depends on node l in network A, then l = i, which rules out the feedback
condition [16]. This full interdependency means that every node i in network A has a
dependent node j in network B, and if node i fails node j will also fail, and vice versa.
(I) Random Attack : We begin by randomly removing a fraction 1−p of nodes and their
links in network A. All the nodes in network B that are dependent on the removed nodes
in network A are also removed along with their connectivity links. As nodes and links are
sequentially removed, each network begins to break down into connected components. Due
to interdependency, the removal process iterates back and forth between the two networks
until they fragment completely or produce a mutually connected giant component with no
further disintegration. As in Ref. [10] we introduce the function gA(p) = 1−GA0[1− p(1−
fA)], which is the fraction of nodes that belong to the giant component of network A, where
fA is a function of p that satisfies the transcendental equation fA = GA1[1 − p(1 − fA)].
Similar equations exist for network B. When the system of interdependent networks stops
disintegrating, the fraction of nodes in the mutual giant component is P∞, satisfying
P∞ = xgB(x) = ygA(y), (2.27)
where x and y satisfy
x = pgA(y), y = pgB(x). (2.28)
Excluding the trivial solution x = 0, y = 0 to the equation set above, we combine them
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into a single equation by substitution and obtain,
x = gA[gB(x)p]p. (2.29)
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Figure 2.4: (a) Sizes of the mutually connected giant component of the fully interdependent
bi-Poisson networks as a function of p for λ1 = 4, λ2 = 12 and α = 0.5. Here solid lines
are theoretical predictions, from Eq. (2.27) for RA (blue line) and similarly for LA (green
line), and symbols are simulation results with network size N = 104, where averages are
taken over 10 realizations, under LA (©) and RA (). (b) Percolation thresholds pc of the
fully interdependent bi-Poisson networks with λ1 = 4, λ2 = 12 as a function of α under
LA and RA. Here solid lines are theoretical predictions, from Eq. (2.30) for RA (blue line)
and similarly for LA (green line) and symbols ( for RA and © for LA) with error bars
are simulation results with network size of N = 104 nodes, where averages and standard
deviations are taken from 20 realizations. When α is not 1 or 0, pc(LA) is always larger
than pc(RA).
A nontrivial solution emerges in the critical case (x = xc, p = pc) by equating the
derivatives of both sides of Eq. (2.29) with respect to x
1 = p2
dgA[pgB(x)]
dx
dgB(x)
dx
x=xc,p=pc (2.30)
which, together with Eq. (2.28), gives the solution for pc and the critical size of the mutually
connected giant component, P∞(pc) = xcgB(xc).
(II) Localized Attack : When LA is performed on the one-to-one fully interdependent
networks A and B described above, we can find an equivalent random network E with
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generating function GE0(x) such that after a random attack in which 1−p nodes in network
E are removed, the generating function of the degree distribution of the remaining network
is the same as Gp0(x) (with the substitution of G0(x) by GA0(x)). Then the LA problem
on networks A and B can be mapped to a RA problem on networks E and B. By using
GE0(1− p+ px) = Gp0(x) and from Eq. (3.8) we have
GE0(x) =
1
GA0(f)
GA0[f +
G
′
A0(f)
G
′
A0(1)GA0(f)
(x− 1)]. (2.31)
Thus by mapping the LA problem on interdependent networks A and B to a RA problem
on a transformed pair of interdependent networks E and B, we can apply the mechanism
of RA on interdependent networks to solve pc and P∞(p) under LA.
Note that for pure Poisson distributions, f ≡ G−1A0(p) = ln(p)λ +1, and that by substituting
f into Eq. (2.31) we get GE0(x) = GA0(x). Thus we find that pure Poisson distributions
have exactly the same percolation properties for fully interdependent networks under LA
as those under RA, as found in Ref. [10]. Because the extreme complexity of the above
equations makes it difficult to obtain explicit expressions for pc and P∞(p) except when
degree distributions are simple, we resort to numerical calculations in general.
2.3.2 Results
Fully interdependent networks with bi-Poisson degree distribution
We start with two fully interdependent networks in which the degrees both follow the same
bi-Poisson distribution and carry out a RA on one of the networks, initiating a cascading
failure process that will continue until equilibrium is reached. We then do the same proce-
dure with the same set-up but this time using a LA to initiate the cascading failure process.
Figure 2.4 (a) shows the size of the giant component P∞(p) of the system as a function of the
occupation probability p under LA and under RA. Note that in both RA and LA scenarios
the simulation results and the theoretical results obtained from Eq. (2.27) agree, indicating
that our strategy of finding an equivalent network under LA works. The first-order phase
transition that occurs in both attack scenarios indicates that the interdependency of the
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system makes it much more vulnerable to attack than single networks. When α = 0.5 the
system is more fragile under LA than under RA with pc(LA) > pc(RA), and the giant
components exhibit different behaviors.
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Figure 2.5: (a) Percolation thresholds pc of the fully interdependent bi-Poisson networks
with α ∈ [0, 1], λ1 = 4 and λ2 = 12 as a function of σ2 under LA and RA. Here solid
lines are theoretical predictions, from Eq. (2.30) for RA (blue line) and similarly for LA
(green line) and symbols ( for RA and © for LA) with error bars are simulation results
with network size of N = 104 nodes, where averages and standard deviations are taken
from 20 realizations. (b) Percolation thresholds pc as a function of σ
2 of networks with
bi-Poisson degree distribution under LA and RA with α = 0.5 and µ = 8. Here solid lines
are theoretical predictions, from Eq. (2.30) for RA (red line) and similarly for LA (black
line). Simulation results are marked with symbols ( for RA and© for LA) where average
and error bars are simulation results with network size of N = 104 nodes, taken over 20
realizations. It is shown that as σ2 increases, pc(LA) and pc(RA) increase and overlap at
σ2 = µ = 8.
Figure 2.4 (b) shows how the breadth of the distribution, tuned by changing α with
fixed λ1 and λ2, influences the robustness of the network under both LA and RA. Solid
lines are numerical results using the Newton’s method on Eq. (2.30) and symbols with error
bars are simulation results. Note that only when α = 0 and α = 1 is P (k) reduced to a pure
Poisson, and we have pc(LA) = pc(RA) = 2.4554/ 〈k〉, as in Ref. [10]. When α deviates
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from 0 or 1, i.e., when P (k) deviates from a pure Poisson distribution and takes the form of
a bi-Poisson distribution, pc(LA) > pc(RA), indicating that the system is more vulnerable
under LA than under RA.
Figure 2.5 (a) shows how the percolation thresholds pc under LA and RA, change with
σ2 where α ∈ [0, 1] and λ1 = 4 and λ2 = 12. Similar to single bi-Poisson networks, here in
Fig. 2.5 (a), as σ2 first increases from 12 (α = 0) to 24.25 (α = 0.4375), pc(LA) and pc(RA)
increase accordingly; then as σ2 begins turning back to decrease to 4 (α = 1), pc(LA) and
pc(RA) keep increasing while deviating from their previous trajectories. Namely, for a same
σ2 value corresponding to two different α values, there are two different pc(LA) and pc(RA)
values.
Next we set α = 0.5 and fix µ = 12(λ1 + λ2) = 8 while gradually increasing the differ-
ence between λ1 and λ2 to increase σ
2 monotonically. We find that when the distribution
gets broader, i.e., when σ2 increases, pc(LA) and pc(RA) increase (see Fig. 2.5 (b)) with
pc(LA) ≥ pc(RA), where the equality holds at σ2 = µ = 8.
Fully interdependent networks with Gaussian degree distribution
We construct two fully interdependent networks in which the degrees in each network follow
the same Gaussian distribution and carry out a RA on one of the networks to initiate a
cascading failure process that will continue until it reaches a steady state. We repeat the
action, but this time using a LA. Figure 2.6 (a) shows the sizes of the giant component
P∞(p) as a function of the occupation probability p under both LA and RA. Note that
simulation results and the theoretical results obtained from Eq. (2.27) agree. When µ = 4
and σ2 = 2 the system is more fragile under LA than under RA with pc(LA) < pc(RA),
and the giant components exhibit different behaviors.
If we fix µ, when the Gaussian distribution broadens, i.e., when σ increases, analogous
to what we find in a single Gaussian network, the critical pc behavior of the system differs
under LA from that under RA. Figure 2.6 (b) shows the effect of σ on pc in the fully
interdependent Gaussian networks. When σ2 < µ, pc(LA) < pc(RA), and the opposite
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Figure 2.6: (a) Sizes of the mutually connected giant component of the fully interdependent
Gaussian networks as a function of p with µ = 4 and σ2 = 2. Here solid lines are theoretical
predictions, from Eq. (2.27) for RA (red line)and similarly for LA (black line), and symbols
are simulation results with network size N = 104, where averages are taken over 10 real-
izations, under LA (©) and RA (). (b) Percolation thresholds pc as a function of σ2 of
the fully interdependent Gaussian networks under LA and RA with µ = 4. Here solid lines
are theoretical predictions, from Eq. (2.30) for RA (red line) and similarly for LA (black
line) and symbols ( for RA and © for LA) with error bars are simulation results with
network size of N = 104 nodes, where averages and standard deviations are taken from 20
realizations. It is seen here that as σ2 increases pc(LA) increases and pc(RA) has a tendency
to decrease. As σ2 approaches the value of µ, pc(LA) ≈ pc(RA), which is manifested by the
intersection point shown here.
occurs when σ2 > µ. The intersection point in Fig. 2.6 (b) is located near σ2 ≈ µ, similar
to that in Poisson distribution networks. Thus the system behaves the same under LA as
under RA, confirming the results presented in the previous subsection. Note that our results
show that in both attack scenarios, the interdependency of the system makes it much more
vulnerable to RA and LA compared to single networks (compare Fig. 2.6 (b) to Fig. 2.3
(b)).
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2.4 Summary
In summary, we show that a LA on interdependent networks can be mapped to a RA
problem by transforming the network under initial attack. We also show how the breadth
of the degree distribution affects the robustness of networks against RA and LA respectively.
We show that, in general, as the degree distribution broadens the network becomes more
vulnerable to LA than RA. This finding holds for both single networks and interdependent
networks. This finding also qualitatively explains why the power-law distribution behaves
differently as the degree exponent changes [37].
Chapter 3
k-Core Percolation in Complex Networks:
Comparing RA, LA and TA
3.1 Introduction
In complex networks science, malicious attacks may crucially change the structure, stabil-
ity and function of a network [1–3, 5, 8, 13, 21, 23, 33, 48–61]. The description of an attack
on a network is often represented by the ordinary percolation model in which the giant
connected component serves as the relevant order parameter that shows the robustness of
a macroscopic cluster. The behavior of the giant connected component is characteristic of
the structural transition of networks where nodes suffer random attacks (RA) [1–3, 10, 17–
19, 64], localized attacks (LA) [37, 62, 69], or targeted attacks (TA) [1, 2, 12, 63].
A natural generalization of ordinary percolation is the k-core percolation in which the
behavior of the k-core characterizes the structural change of a network under RA [38–40].
The k-core of a network is defined as the largest subgraph in which each node has at
least k neighbors and is obtained through the pruning process in which nodes of degree
less than k are progressively removed. If k = 1, then the k-core is simply the connected
component of the network and the giant k-core is the giant connected component, exactly
as in ordinary percolation. If k = 2, then we again have a continuous transition similar to
ordinary percolation, as the 2-core is obtained by simply pruning all dangling branches from
the 1-core [38, 41]. Under the k-core percolation with k ≥ 3, single networks demonstrate
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discontinuous transitions at a k-dependent critical threshold pc(k) [38–40]. Although prior
research has developed tools for probing network resilience against RA in the context of k-
core percolation, and has found that degree distribution strongly influences network stability
[38, 39], a systematic study of how TA and LA affect network resilience in the case of k-core
percolation is still missing.
Here we extend the general formalism of the k-core percolation for uncorrelated net-
works with arbitrary degree distributions under RA [38, 39] to networks under LA and TA,
respectively. This allows us to obtain the sizes and other structural characteristics of k-cores
in a variety of damaged random networks and to compare the robustness of the networks
under these three types of attack scenarios in terms of k-core percolation.
We apply our derived general frameworks to study (i) single ER networks [26, 71] with
a Poisson distribution, (ii) single SF networks [21, 33, 50] with a power-law distribution,
(iii) two interdependent ER networks with the same Poisson distribution in each network,
and (iv) two interdependent SF networks with the same power-law distribution in each net-
work. For each case, we investigate how the type of attack influences the k-core percolation
properties. These include the size of the k-core, Mk(p), as a function of p, the fraction of
unremoved nodes and the critical threshold pc(k) at which the k-core Mk(p) first collapses.
In all cases we find that our extensive simulations and analytical calculations are in good
agreement. In general, TA exerts the biggest destruction on the k-core structure of networks
since the hubs of the networks−nodes with higher degrees−are more likely to be removed
initially. We observe similar characteristics of robustness in both single and interdependent
ER networks under both LA and RA. However, for SF networks, LA exerts considerably
more damage than RA does to the core structure.
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3.2 RA, LA, and TA on a Single Network
3.2.1 Theory
(I) Random attack: Following Ref. [46], we introduce the generating function of the degree
distribution P (q) of a random network A as
G0(x) =
∑
q
P (q)xq. (3.1)
After an initial attack which is manifested by the random removal of a fraction 1 − p
of nodes from the network of size N , a cascading pruning process occurs as nodes with
degree less than k are progressively disconnected from the network. We denote the stage
right after the random attack as stage t = 0 and the probability that a given end of an edge
is the root of an infinite (k-1)-ary subtree as f0 [38]. After the first round of the pruning
process which disconnects those nodes with active degree less than k to the rest of network,
we obtain a network in which a fraction 1− p of nodes failed due to initial attack and some
other fraction of nodes have become isolated due to k-core percolation. Now this network
is at stage t = 1 and at this time f0 decreases to f1. Note that an end of an edge is a root
of an infinite (k-1)-ary subtree if at least k − 1 of its children’s branches are also roots of
infinite (k-1)-ary subrees [38]. This leads to the equation for f1 in terms of f0, which is
f1 = p
∞∑
q=k−1
P (q + 1)(q + 1)
〈q〉
q∑
j=k−1
Cjqf
j
0 (1− f0)q−j
≡ pΦ(f0), (3.2)
where Cjq = q!/(q − j)!j!, p is the probability that the end of the edge is occupied,
P (q + 1)(q + 1)/〈q〉 is the probability that a randomly chosen edge leads to a node with
q out-going edges (other than the one first chosen) and Cjqf
j
0 (1 − f0)q−j is the probability
that j out of these q branches are roots of infinite (k-1)-ary subrees. Note that j here must
be at least equal to k − 1.
Similarly, after the pruning process finishes for the second time, we would have f2 =
pΦ(f1). More generally, at each stage t, we have ft obtained from ft−1 through
ft = pΦ(ft−1), (3.3)
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and the probability that a random node in the damaged network belongs to the k-core
is [38]
[Mk(p)]t = p
∞∑
q=k
P (q)
q∑
j=k
Cjqft
j(1− ft)q−j
≡ pΨ(ft). (3.4)
Note that [Mk(p)]t is also the normalized size of the k-core of the network at this stage. As
t → ∞, the network will reach a steady state and we have ft → f , with f satisfying the
self-consistent equation
f = pΦ(f). (3.5)
Note an equivalent equation for f at the steady state was also given in Eq. (2) of Ref. [38].
We note that for any given p, f can be solved from Eq. (3.5) using Newton’s method
with a proper initial value. A trivial solution f = 0 exists if the occupation probability p
is small and thereafter Mk(p) = 0, i.e., no k-core exists in this case. As p increases and at
p = pRAc (k), a non-trivial solution f = fc 6= 0 first arises and gives birth to a k-core. This is
typical first-order phase transition behavior for the network and it requires the derivatives
of both sides of Eq. (3.5) with respect to fc be equal [38, 39], i.e.,
1 = pRAc (k)Φ
′
(fc). (3.6)
Therefore by using Eqs. (3.5) and (3.6), the threshold of k-core percolation pRAc (k) is de-
termined by
pRAc (k) = 1/Φ
′
(fc), fc = Φ(fc)/Φ
′
(fc). (3.7)
Here, fc is the value of f at the birth of a k-core. When p > p
RA
c (k), there is always a
non-zero solution of f that ensures the existence of a k-core.
(II) Localized attack: We next consider the localized attack on network A by the removal
of a fraction 1 − p of nodes, starting with a randomly-chosen seed node. Here we remove
the seed node and its nearest neighbors, next-nearest neighbors, and next-next-nearest
neighbors and continue until a fraction 1−p of nodes have been removed from the network.
34
This pattern of attack reflects such real-world localized scenarios as earthquakes or the
results of weapons of mass destruction. As in Ref. [37], the localized attack occurs in two
stages: (i) Nodes belonging to the attacked area (the seed node and the layers surrounding
it) are removed but the links connecting them to the remaining nodes of the network are
left in place, but then (ii) these links are also removed. Following the method introduced in
Refs. [37, 68], we find the generating function for the degree distribution of the remaining
network to be
Gp0(x) =
1
G0(l)
G0[l +
G
′
0(l)
G
′
0(1)
(x− 1)], (3.8)
where l ≡ G−10 (p).
Next we want to find an equivalent network A˜ such that a random removal of a fraction
1 − p of nodes from it will produce a network with the same degree distribution as that
obtained by a LA on network A described above. We denote P (q
′
) as the degree distri-
bution of network A˜ and G˜A0(x) as its generating function. Following the argument of
equivalence discussed above and by setting G˜A0(1− p+ px) = Gp0(x) [8, 69], and after some
rearrangement, we have G˜A0(x) as
G˜A0(x) =
1
G0(l)
G0[l +
G
′
0(l)
G
′
0(1)G0(l)
(x− 1)]. (3.9)
Therefore, P (q′) could be generated from G˜A0(x) through direct differentiation [8]
P (q′) =
1
q′!
dq
′
dxq′
G˜A0(x). (3.10)
Combining Eqs. (3.9) and (3.10) we obtain the degree distribution of the equivalent network
A˜ as
P (q′) =
∞∑
q=q′
lq
p
P (q)Cq
′
q (
p˜
p
)q
′
(1− p˜
p
)q−q
′
, (3.11)
with p˜ = G
′
0(l)/G
′
0(1)l.
Thus performing k-core percolation on the resultant network after LA is equivalent to
performing k-core percolation on network A˜ after a random removal of the same fraction of
nodes. This enables us to transform a LA problem into the familiar RA problem examined
in the previous scenario. Then for the LA scenario we replace P (q) in Eqs. (3.4) and (3.5)
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with P (q′) obtained from Eq. (3.11) and obtain the size of k-core Mk(p) as well as its critical
threshold pLAc (k).
(III) Targeted attack: Next, we consider the targeted attack on network A by the re-
moval of a fraction 1− p of nodes where nodes are removed based on their degree [12, 63].
This pattern of attack reflects such real-world cases as intentional attacks on important
transportation hubs or sabotage on the Internet [4]. To analyze this case, a value Wα(qi) is
assigned to each node, which represents the probability that a node i with qi links is initially
attacked and becomes dysfunctional. This probability is described through the family of
functions [7]
Wα(qi) =
qαi∑N
i=1 q
α
i
,−∞ < α < +∞. (3.12)
When α > 0, nodes with higher connectivity have a higher probability to be removed while
α < 0 indicates otherwise. Note that for α = 0, all nodes have equal probability to be
removed, which is exactly the same as the RA case.
As described in Ref. [12], the targeted attack occurs in two stages: (i) Nodes are chosen
according to Eq. (3.12) and later removed but the links connecting the removed nodes and
the remaining nodes are left in place, but then (ii) these links are also removed.
Following the method introduced in Refs. [12, 68], we find the generating function for
the degree distribution of the remaining network to be (only removing the nodes)
Gb(x) =
1
p
∑
q
P (q)lq
α
xq, (3.13)
where l = G−1α (p) and Gα(x) ≡
∑∞
q=0 P (q)x
qα . The fraction of the original links that
connect to the remaining nodes is p˜ =
∑
q P (q)ql
qα/
∑
q P (q)q. Further removing the links
which end at the removed nodes of a randomly connected network is equivalent to randomly
removing a fraction 1 − p˜ of links of the remaining nodes. Using the approach introduced
in Ref. [8], we find that the generating function of the remaining nodes after the removal of
the links between removed nodes and remaining nodes is
Gc(x) = Gb(1− p˜+ p˜x). (3.14)
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Figure 3.1: (Color online) Dynamics of an ER network near criticality under random attack
applying k-core percolation. (a) Dynamical process of the k-core size [Mk(p)]t of the ER
network with k = 4, λ = 10 and N = 106 both in theory (red line with circles) and in
simulation (solid black lines) at p = 0.5145, slightly below pRAc (k) = 0.515. (b) Number of
iterations (NOI) before network reaching stability. This number peaks at p = pRAc and it
drops quickly as p moves away from pRAc (k) [72, 73]. (c) At p = 0.5145, the red line with
circles represents the variation of failure sizes st (only the plateau stage) for one realization
in the simulation; the black dashed line shows st for the theoretical case. (d) At p = 0.5145,
the red line with rectangles shows the variation of the average branching factor ηt for one
realization in the simulation; the black dashed line shows ηt of the analytic solution. Note
that this figure is similar to that found in interdependent networks [73].
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Next we find an equivalent network B˜ in which a random removal of a fraction 1 − p of
nodes will produce a network with the same degree distribution as that obtained by a TA
on network A described above. We denote P (q
′
) as the degree distribution of network
B˜ and G˜B0(x) as its generating function. Following the equivalence argument discussed
above and setting G˜B0(1 − p + px) = Gc(x) [8], after some algebra, we obtain G˜B0(x) as
G˜B0(x) = Gc(1 +
1
p(x− 1)). Using Eq. (3.14), we thus have
G˜B0(x) = Gb(
p˜
p
(x− 1) + 1). (3.15)
Accordingly, combining Eqs. (3.13) and (3.15) and using direct differentiation we obtain the
degree distribution P (q′) of the equivalent network B˜ as
P (q′) =
∞∑
q=q′
lq
α
p
P (q)Cq
′
q (
p˜
p
)q
′
(1− p˜
p
)q−q
′
. (3.16)
Thus performing k-core percolation on network A after a TA is the same as performing
the k-core percolation on network B˜ after a random removal of the same fraction of nodes.
By replacing P (q) in Eqs. (3.4) and (3.5) with P (q′) obtained from Eq. (3.16), for the TA
scenario we can obtain the size of k-core Mk(p) together with its critical threshold p
TA
c (k).
3.2.2 Results
To test the analytical solutions derived in Sect. A, we conduct numerical solutions of the
analytic expressions, and compare the results with simulation results on single networks
with degrees following both Poisson distributions and power-law distributions under RA,
LA, and TA. All the simulation results are obtained for networks with N = 106 nodes.
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks
We first consider ER networks of which the degree distribution is Poissonian, i.e., P (q) =
e−λ λ
q
q! with the average degree denoted by λ.
In the RA scenario on an ER network with k = 4 and λ = 10, we exhibit in Fig. 3.1(a)
several realizations the cascading pruning process under k-core percolation with p slightly
smaller than pRAc (k), in comparison with theory. Note that the simulation results for the
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cascading pruning agree well with analytical results from Eqs. (3.3) and (3.4). Different re-
alizations give different results due to random fluctuations of the dynamic processes showing
deviations from the mean field, rendering small fluctuations around the mean-field analyt-
ical result. To calculate the first-order phase transition point pRAc (k) with good precision,
as shown in Fig. 3.1(b), we identify the characteristic behavior of the number of iterations
(NOI) in the cascading process [72]. This gives us pRAc (k) = 0.515, corresponding to the
peak of the NOI. Figures 3.1(c) and 3.1(d) show the variation of the pruning size st, which is
the number of nodes that are pruned at stage t, and the branching factor ηt (ηt = st+1/st),
respectively, in one typical realization that finally reached total collapse. Note that st ini-
tially drops as the network is still well connected and thus fewer nodes are pruned per
pruning step (st > st+1). Then the network becomes weak enough and st remains at low
and almost constant value during the plateau stage while the network keeps getting weaker.
Finally st rises as a failure in the current step leads to more than one failure in the next step
and results in the total collapse of the network [see Fig. 3.1(c)]. Although st first decreases,
the ratio of two consecutive pruning sizes, ηt, increases. Specifically ηt increases during the
initial cascades from below 1 to approximately 1 (with some fluctuations) at the plateau,
which starts at time T when each of the sT pruned nodes leads, on average, to failure of
another single node. This is a stable state, leading to the divergence of t for N → ∞,
where the cascading trees become critical branching processes [73, 74] with the average time
at criticality scales as N1/3 [73]. In a finite network of size N , however, the accumulated
failures weaken the network step by step and thus st starts to rise, leading to the collapse
of the system. During this period, ηt rises to above 1 as shown in Fig. 3.1(d).
When the dynamics end, the network enters the steady state. At this state, Fig. 3.2 (a)
shows the k-core Mk(p) as a function of the occupation probability p under RA, LA and TA
(with α = 1) in the context of k-core percolation. Note that the simulation results agree
well with the theoretical results and that there is first-order percolation transition behavior
in all attack scenarios. Note also that pRAc (k) is equal to p
LA
c (k) and they both are smaller
than pTAc (k). This is similar to ordinary percolation [12, 37].
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Figure 3.2: (a) Sizes of the k-core, Mk(p), as a function of the fraction of unremoved
nodes, p, for a single ER network with λ = 10 and k = 4. Here solid lines are theoretical
predictions, from Eq. (3.4) for RA and its counterparts of LA and TA (with α = 1), and
symbols are simulation results with network size N = 106, under RA (©), LA () and TA
(M). Note that for ordinary percolation under either RA or LA, the system is significantly
more resilient, and the transition is continuous at pc = 1/λ = 0.1. (b)Percolation thresholds
pc(k) of a single ER network as a function of k under RA, LA and TA with α = 1, λ = 10.
Here solid lines are theoretical predictions and symbols (© for RA,  for LA, 4 for TA
with α = 1.0 and 5 are for TA with α = 2.0) are simulation results with network size of
N = 106 nodes. Note that LA coincides with RA.
This is the case because for ER networks with P (q) = e−λ λ
q
q! , from Eq. (3.11) the degree
distribution P (q′) of the equivalent network A˜ can be calculated to be
P (q′) =
∞∑
q=q′
lq
p
P (q)Cq
′
q (
p˜
p
)q
′
(1− p˜
p
)q−q
′
=
e−λ[λl p˜p ]
q′
pq′!
∞∑
q=q′
[λl(1− p˜p)]q−q
′
(q − q′)!
=
e−λ[λl p˜p ]
q′
pq′!
e
λl(1− p˜
p
)
= e−λ
λq
′
q′!
, (3.17)
where we use l = ln(p)λ + 1 and p˜ = p/l for simplification. Note that from Eq. (3.17) the
degree distribution of network A˜ is also Poissonian and has the same average degree λ as the
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Figure 3.3: (a) Graphical solution of Eq. (3.5) for the k-core percolation with k = 4 in an
ER network under RA with an average degree of 10. The straight line and the curves pΦ(f)
show, respectively, the left- and right-hand side of Eq. (3.5) as functions of f for different
values of p. The nonzero solution of f appears above the critical value pRAc (k) = 0.515, at
which the right-hand side curve pΦ(f) starts to intersect the straight line. The physical
solution is provided by the largest root of the equation f = pΦ(f) when p > pRAc (k) (the
upper intersection in the plot). (b) Graphical solution of Eqs. (3.19) and Eq. (3.20) for the
k-core percolation with k = (3, 4) and d = 0.5 in two interdependent ER networks A and B
with the average degree 10, where network A is damaged initially under RA. The blue and
red curves show, respectively, Eq. (3.19) and Eq. (3.20) for the value of p = pRAc (k). The
nontrivial solution of fA and fB appears at the critical value p
RA
c (k) = 0.391, at which the
two curves intersect tangentially with each other, satisfying Eq. (3.22). When p > pRAc (k),
these two curves will always have a nonzero intersection and it serves as the physical solution
original network. Thus, we have pRAc (k) = p
LA
c (k) as observed. Similarly from Eq. (3.16)
with α = 1, we find the degree distribution P (q′) of the equivalent network B˜ to be
P (q′) = e−λl
2 (λl2)q
′
q′!
, (3.18)
with l = ln(p)λ + 1. Note that from Eq. (3.18) the degree distribution of network B˜ is also
Poissonian but has a smaller average degree λl2 as l is always smaller than 1 [12]. Compared
to that under RA, the removal of the same fraction of nodes under TA reduces a larger
amount of connectivity in the network and therefore, in the context of k-core percolation,
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the critical threshold pTAc (k) is significantly larger than p
RA
c (k).
Next we obtain the relationship between the robustness of the network under the three
types of attacks and the threshold k in the context of k-core percolation. Figure 3.2 (b)
shows how the percolation thresholds pc(k) under RA, LA and TA, change with k where
λ = 10 for a single ER network. Here in Fig. 3.2 (b), as k increases from 3 to 7, pRAc (k),
pLAc (k) and p
TA
c (k) increase accordingly. For each k value, p
RA
c (k) = p
LA
c (k) < p
TA
c (k, α =
1.0) < pTAc (k, α = 2.0), which indicates that in the context of k-core percolation RA and
LA cause the same amount of damage to the structure of an ER network, but that TA
causes more severe structural damage to an ER network. Moreover, we find that RA and
LA have very similar dynamic properties in terms of NOI as well as the pruning size st.
Figure 3.2 (b) also indicates that with a larger α, TA will cause more damage since higher
degree nodes are more likely to be removed. Similar results are reported in the context of
ordinary percolation on ER networks [12, 37].
As an example, Fig. 3.3 (a) shows the solution of Eq. (3.5) for different values of the
occupation probability p under RA and demonstrates the origin of the first-order transition.
When p < pRAc (k), the straight line and the curve only have an intersection at f = 0, which
always renders Mk(p) = 0 according to Eq. (3.4). A k-core Mk(p) first arises discontinuously
at p = pRAc (k), when the straight line and the curve tangentially touch each other at a
nonzero intersection at f = fc, satisfying Eq. (3.6). As p increases further and becomes
greater than pRAc (k), Mk(p) continues to exist as an additional intersection appears, and
this serves as the physical solution of f (see the upper intersection in Fig. 3.3 (a)). Similar
procedures are applied to the LA and TA scenarios as well and the corresponding pLAc (k)
and pTAc (k) are obtained, respectively.
Single scale-free networks
We next consider SF networks in which degrees of nodes follow a power-law distribution,
i.e., P (q) ∝ q−γ with the degree exponent γ ∈ (2, 3]. As in Ref. [38], a size-dependent
cutoff qcut(N) of the degree distribution is introduced. For the configuration model without
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multiple connections the dependence qcut(N) ∼
√
N is usually used when 2 < γ ≤ 3, and
first-order percolation transition behavior was observed in the RA case [38]. Figure 3.4 (a)
shows Mk(p) as a function of the occupation probability p under RA, LA and TA (with
α = 1) under k-core percolation with k = 4 and γ = 2.3. The simulation results agree
well with the theoretical results, and there is first-order percolation transition behavior in
all attack scenarios. Note that pLAc (k) is approximately equal to p
TA
c (k), and that they
both are significantly larger than pRAc (k). Because SF networks are ultrasmall [21, 75], the
LA process can easily spread from the seed node to high degree hubs in several steps and
therefore severely disrupt the core structure of the network, an outcome similar to that
of the TA process. This is in marked contrast to the case of ER networks in which the
majority of nodes have degrees around the average degree and therefore for the RA and LA
processes, nodes of high degrees are less likely to be reached than those in the TA process.
Next we determine the relationship between the robustness of the network under three
types of attacks and the threshold k in the context of k-core percolation. For a single
SF network, Fig. 3.4 (b) shows how the percolation thresholds pc(k) under RA, LA and
TA (with α = 1) change with k for two values of γ. As seen in Fig. 3.4 (b), the pc(k)
values under all attack scenarios for γ = 2.3 are smaller than those for γ = 2.6, which
indicates that SF networks with smaller γ values are more stable in the context of k-core
percolation. In addition, for each value of γ as k increases from 3 to 7, pRAc (k), p
LA
c (k) and
pTAc (k) increase accordingly. For each k value, p
LA
c (k) ≈ pTAc (k) > pRAc (k), which indicates
that in the context of k-core percolation, LA and TA (with α = 1) exert approximately
the same amount of damage to the structure of a SF network whereas RA produces less
severe structural damage to a SF network. Analogous results are reported in the context
of ordinary percolation on SF networks [12, 37].
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Figure 3.4: (a) Sizes of the k-core, Mk(p), as a function of the fraction of unremoved nodes,
p, for a single SF network with γ = 2.3, qmin = 2, qcut(N) = 1000 and k = 4. Here solid
lines are theoretical predictions, from Eq. (3.4) for RA and its counterparts of LA and TA
(with α = 1), and symbols are simulation results with network size N = 106, under RA
(©), LA () and TA (4). (b) Percolation thresholds pc(k) of a single SF network as a
function of k under RA, LA and TA with α = 1, qmin = 2, qcut(N) = 1000 for γ = 2.3
(solid red lines) and γ = 2.6 (dashed purple lines). Here lines are theoretical predictions
and symbols (© for RA,  for LA and 4 are for TA) are simulation results with network
size of N = 106 nodes.
3.3 RA, LA, and TA on Interdependent Networks
3.3.1 Theory
We extend the formalism of ordinary percolation on fully interdependent networks intro-
duced in Ref. [10] to k-core percolation. Specifically, we consider two networks A and B
with the same number of nodes N . Within each network the nodes are randomly connected
with the same degree distribution P (q). A fraction dA of nodes from network A depend
on nodes in network B, and a fraction dB of nodes from network B depend on nodes in
network A. We also assume that if a node i in network A depends on a node j in network
B and node j depends on node l in network A, then l = i, which rules out the feedback
condition [16]. This interdependence means that if node i in network A fails, its dependent
node j in network B will also fail, and vice versa.
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(I) Random attack : We begin by randomly removing a fraction 1−p of nodes in network
A. All the nodes in network B that are dependent on the removed nodes in network A are
also removed. Then a cascading pruning process begins, and nodes with degree less than
k1 in network A and k2 in network B are sequentially removed in the k-core percolation
process. Due to interdependence, the removal process iterates back and forth between the
two networks until they fragment completely or produce a mutually connected k-core with
no further disintegration, where k ≡ (k1, k2) [10, 40].
When the system of interdependent networks stops disintegrating, as in a single network
we let fA(fB) be the probability that a given end of an edge of network A(B) is the root of
an infinite (k1(2)-1)-ary subtree. An end of an edge is a root of an infinite (k1-1)-ary subtree
of network A if it is an autonomous node [11] and at least k1 − 1 of its children’s branches
are also roots of infinite (k1-1)-ary subrees; otherwise, despite that, the node it depends
on has to be in the k2-core of network B. Similar arguments exist for edges in network B.
These lead to the equation of fA in terms of fA and fB as
fA = pΦA(fA)(1− dA) + pΦA(fA)ΨB(fB)dA
= pΦA(fA) [(1− dA) + dAΨB(fB)] , (3.19)
where p is the probability that an end n0 of an edge is occupied, ΦA(fA) is the probability
that n0 is a root of an infinite (k1-1)-ary subtree, 1 − dA is the probability that n0 is
an autonomous node, dA is the probability that n0 depends on a node n
′ in network B,
and ΨB(fB) is the probability that n
′ is in the k2-core of network B. Following similar
arguments, we obtain the equation of fB in terms of fA and fB,
fB = ΦB(fB) [(1− dB) + dBpΨA(fA)] . (3.20)
Note that for any given value of p, fA and fB can be solved from Eqs. (3.19) and (3.20)
using Newton’s method after choosing appropriate initial values. We denote MAk (p) and
MBk (p) as the probability that a randomly chosen node in network A and B belongs to the
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mutually connected k-core, respectively, and they satisfyM
A
k (p) = pΨA(fA) [1− dA + dAΨB(fB)] ,
MBk (p) = ΨB(fB) [1− dB + dBpΨA(fA)] .
(3.21)
Note that the mutually connected k-core is made up of the k1-core in network A [with its
normalized size denoted by MAk (p)] and the k2-core in network B [with its normalized size
denoted by MBk (p)].
The trivial solution fA = fB = 0 for low occupation probability p signifies the absence
of a k-core in the system. As p increases, a nontrivial solution emerges in the critical case
(p = pRAc (k)) in which two curves fA = fA(fB) and fB = fB(fA) tangentially touch each
other, i.e.,
dfA
dfB
· dfB
dfA
= 1 (3.22)
which, together with Eqs. (3.19) and (3.20), gives the solution for pRAc (k) and the critical
size of the mutually connected k-core. When p > pRAc (k), these two curves will always have
a nonzero intersection that constitutes a physical solution. For simplicity and without loss
of generality, we use dA = dB ≡ d throughout the rest of this paper.
(II) Localized attack : When LA is performed on the system of interdependent networks A
and B described above, we find an equivalent random network E with a degree distribution
P (q′) [from Eq. (3.11)] such that after a random attack in which a fraction 1− p of nodes
in network E are removed, the degree distribution of the remaining network is the same as
the degree distribution of the remaining network resulting from an LA on network A. Then
by mapping the LA problem on interdependent networks A and B to a RA problem on a
transformed pair of interdependent networks E and B, we can apply the mechanism of RA
on interdependent networks to solve pLAc (k) and the mutually connected k-core under LA.
(III) Targeted Attack : Analogously, when TA is performed on the interdependent net-
works A and B described above, we find an equivalent random network F with a degree
distribution P (q′) [from Eq. (3.16)] such that after a random attack in which a fraction
1− p of nodes in network F are removed, the degree distribution of the remaining network
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is the same as the degree distribution of the remaining network resulting from an TA on
network A. Thus, by mapping the TA problem on interdependent networks A and B to a
RA problem on a transformed pair of interdependent networks F and B, we can apply the
mechanism of RA on interdependent networks to solve pTAc (k) and the mutually connected
k-core under TA in the case of k-core percolation.
3.3.2 Results
Two interdependent Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks
We start with two partially interdependent networks in which the degrees both follow the
same Poisson distribution and exert a RA on network A, initiating a k-core percolation
pruning process that continues until equilibrium is reached. We then follow the same
procedure with the same set-up but this time using a LA and TA to initiate the pruning
process. Figure 3.5 (a) shows the k-core MAk (p) of network A as a function of the occupation
probability p under RA, LA and TA (with α = 1) in the context of k-core percolation with
d = 0.5, k = (3, 4) and λ = 10. The simulation results agree well with the theoretical
results, and there are first-order percolation transitions in all attack scenarios. As in single
ER networks, note that pRAc (k) is equal to p
LA
c (k) and both are smaller than p
TA
c (k).
Next we obtain the relationship between the robustness of the network system, i.e., the
threshold pc(k), under three types of attacks and the interdependence strength d in the
context of k-core percolation. Figure 3.5 (b) shows how the percolation thresholds pc(k)
under RA, LA and TA (with α = 1), change with d where k = (3, 4) and λ = 10 for
two ER networks. As seen in Fig. 3.5 (b), when d increases from 0 to 1, pRAc (k), p
LA
c (k)
and pTAc (k) increase accordingly, which means that the higher the level of interdependence
between networks A and B, the less resilient they are against attacks. Note that d = 0
corresponds to the case in which there is no interdependence between networks A and B
and the thresholds pc(k) reduce to those shown in Fig. 3.2 (b) at k = 3. For each d value,
pRAc (k) = p
LA
c (k) < p
TA
c (k), which indicates that in the context of k-core percolation, RA
and LA exert the same level of damage to the structure of an ER network, but that TA
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Figure 3.5: (a) Sizes of k-core of network A, MAk (p), as a function of the fraction of unre-
moved nodes, p, for two partially interdependent ER networks with d = 0.5, λ = 10 and
k = (3, 4). Here solid red lines are theoretical predictions, from Eq. (3.21) for RA and its
counterparts of LA and TA for α = 1, and symbols are simulation results with network
size N = 106, under RA (©), LA () and TA (4). (b)Percolation thresholds pc(k) of two
interdependent ER networks as a function of interdependence strength d under RA, LA and
TA with λ = 10 and k = (3, 4). Here solid lines are theoretical predictions and symbols (©
for RA,  for LA and 4 are for TA) are simulation results with network size of N = 106
nodes. Note that for d = 0 the results reduce to the case of single networks with k = 3,
shown in Fig. 3.4.
produces more severe damage to an ER network. Similar results are reported in the context
of ordinary percolation on interdependent ER networks [12, 69].
Figure 3.3 (b) shows for instance the critical solution of Eqs. (3.19) and (3.20) for the
case of RA shown in Fig. 3.5 (a). When p < pRAc (k), the two curves representing Eqs. (3.19)
and (3.20) correspondingly intersect only at the origin, and this always renders a zero-sized
k-core MAk (p) according to Eq. (3.21). A k-core M
A
k (p) first arises discontinuously at
p = pRAc (k), when these two curves tangentially touch each other at a nonzero intersection
at (fAc, fBc), satisfying Eq. (3.22). As p increases further above p
RA
c (k), M
A
k (p) continues to
exist because of the presence of a nonzero intersection that serves as the nontrivial solution
of Eqs. (3.19) and (3.20). Similar procedures are applied to the LA and TA scenarios as
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well and the corresponding pLAc (k) and p
TA
c (k) are obtained, respectively.
Two interdependent scale-free networks
We construct two interdependent networks in which the degrees in each follow the same
power-law distribution. Figure 3.6 (a) shows the k-core MAk (p) of network A as a function of
the occupation probability p under RA, LA, and TA (with α = 1) under k-core percolation
with k = (3, 4) and γ = 2.3. The simulation results agree well with the theoretical results,
and there is first-order percolation transition behavior in all attack scenarios. Note that
pLAc (k) is approximately equal to p
TA
c (k) and they both are significantly larger than p
RA
c (k).
As in single SF networks, the LA process can easily spread from the seed node to high-
degree hubs in few steps and therefore greatly disintegrates the core structure of the network,
similarly to the TA process. This is in strong contrast to the case of ER networks in which
most nodes have degrees close to the average degree and therefore for the RA and LA
processes, nodes of high degrees are less likely to be removed compared to the TA process.
Next we compare the robustness of the network system under each of the three types of
attacks as a function of the interdependence strength d in the context of k-core percolation.
Figure 3.6 (b) shows how the percolation thresholds pc(k) under RA, LA and TA (with
α = 1), change with d where k = (3, 4) and γ = 2.3 for two SF networks. Here in Fig. 3.6
(b), as d increases from 0 to 1, pRAc (k), p
LA
c (k) and p
TA
c (k) increase accordingly, which
means that the more interdependent networks A ad B are on each other, the less resilient
they will be against attacks. Note that the d = 0 case corresponds to the scenario shown in
Fig. 3.4 (b) at k = 3. For each d value, pLAc (k) ≈ pTAc (k) > pRAc (k), which indicates that in
the context of k-core percolation, LA and TA (with α = 1) exert approximately the same
level of damage to the structure of a SF network, whereas RA produces less severe damage
to a SF network. Similar results are reported in the context of ordinary percolation on SF
networks [12, 37].
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Figure 3.6: (a) Sizes of the k-core of network A, MAk (p), as a function of the fraction of
unremoved nodes, p, for two partially interdependent SF networks with d = 0.5, γ = 2.3,
qmin = 2, qcut(N) = 1000 and k = (3, 4). Here solid lines are theoretical predictions, from
Eq. (3.21) for RA and its counterparts of LA and TA for α = 1, and symbols are simulation
results with network size N = 106, under RA (©), LA () and TA (4). (b) Percola-
tion thresholds pc(k) of two interdependent SF networks as a function of interdependence
strength d under RA, LA and TA with α = 1, qmin = 2, qcut(N) = 1000, γ = 2.3 and
k = (3, 4). Here solid lines are theoretical predictions and symbols (© for RA,  for LA
and 4 are for TA) are simulation results with network size of N = 106 nodes. Note that
for d=0 the results reduce to the case of single networks with k=3, seen in Fig. 3.4 (b).
3.4 Summary
We have studied and compared the robustness of both single and interdependent networks
under three types of attacks in the context of k-core percolation. We show that interde-
pendence between networks makes the system more vulnerable than their single network
counterparts. In addition, we map a network under LA and TA into an equivalent network
under RA, solve analytically the k-core percolation problem, and show how the initial at-
tack type affects the robustness of networks. In general, TA exerts the most damage. In
particular, LA and RA cause equal damage to ER networks, whereas in ultrasmall networks,
like SF networks, LA causes much more damage than does RA. These findings hold for both
single networks and interdependent networks.
Chapter 4
Percolation of Networks with Directed
Dependency Links
4.1 Introduction
Complex networks science has become an effective tool for modeling complex systems. It
treats system entities as nodes and the mutually supporting or cooperating relations be-
tween the entities as connectivity links [1–3, 8, 21, 23, 46, 48, 51, 52, 76, 77]. In many systems,
nodes that survive and fail together form dependency groups through dependency links. De-
pendency links denote the damaging or destructive relations among entities [10, 14, 16, 63,
69, 78–81]. Compared to ordinary networks [21, 46, 48], networks with dependency groups
or links are more vulnerable and subject to catastrophic collapse [9, 72]. The previous works
have studied the network system in which the dependency groups, with sizes either fixed at
two [72] or characterized by different classic distributions [9], are formed through undirected
dependency links. The outcome when the dependency links are directed, however, is more
general. For example, in a financial network where each company has trading and sales con-
nections (connectivity links) with other companies, the connections enable the companies
to interact with others and function together as a global financial market, and companies
that belong to the same corporate group strongly depend on the parent company (i.e. there
are directed dependency links), but the reverse is not true [82]. Another example is in a
social network in which people (followers) follow trends set by celebrities (pioneers), e.g.,
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Figure 4.1: (Color online) Demonstration of the synergy between the percolation process
and the dependency process that leads to a cascade of failures. The network contains two
types of links: connectivity links (solid black lines) and directed dependency links (dashed
red arrows). (a)→(b) Initial failure: a random node is removed. (c)→(e) Synergy between
percolation process and dependency process: nodes cut off from the giant component or
depending on failed nodes are removed. (f) Steady state: the surviving giant component
contains four nodes.
popular singers and actors but the reverse is not true [83].
We use a self-consistent probabilistic framework [18, 38, 42, 84] to study the percolation
phase transitions in a random network A with both connectivity and directed dependency
links. Randomly removing a fraction 1 − p of nodes in network A causes (i) connectivity
links to be disconnected, causing some nodes and clusters to fail due to the disconnection
to the network giant component (percolation process), and (ii) failing nodes to make their
dependent nodes to also fail even though they are still connected to the network giant
component via connectivity links (dependency process). Thus, the removal of nodes in
the percolation process leads to the failure of dependent nodes in the dependency process,
which in turn initiates a new percolation process, which further sets off a dependency
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process, and so on. We show that this synergy between the percolation process and the
dependency process leads to a cascade of failures that continues until no further nodes fail
(See Fig. 4.1).
To fully capture the structure of network A, we introduce the degree distribution P (k)
and, in addition, the directed dependency degree distribution Q(ko), which is the probability
that a randomly chosen node has ko directed dependency links connecting to ko nodes which
are supporting this chosen node. In our model, when i depends on ko nodes, we assume
that if any one of these ko nodes fails, node i will fail too (see Fig. 4.1). Usually, this kind of
multiplex has both first- and second-order phase transitions [9, 72]. Here we find that Q(ko)
strongly affects the robustness of network A. Specifically, the percolation threshold pIIc ,
at which network A disintegrates in a form of second-order phase transition, is determined
solely by Q(0) for a given Q(ko), and Q(0) +Q(1) characterizes the boundary between the
first-order phase transition and the second-order phase transition regime.
4.2 The Model
or a random network A of size N with both connectivity links and directed dependency
links [see Fig. 4.1(a)], as in Ref. [46], we introduce the generating function G0(z) of the
degree distribution P (k),
G0(z) =
∑
k
P (k)zk. (4.1)
Analogously, we have the generating function of the related branching processes [46],
G1(z) =
G
′
0(z)
G
′
0(1)
=
∑
k
kP (k)
〈k〉 z
k−1. (4.2)
Similarly, we introduce the generating function for the directed dependency degree distri-
bution Q(ko) as
D(z) =
∑
ko
Q(ko)z
ko . (4.3)
We designate h(s) the probability distribution of the number of nodes approachable along
the directed dependency links starting from a randomly chosen node in network A. This
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allows us to write the generating function H(z) for h(s), i.e.,
H(z) =
∑
s
h(s)zs. (4.4)
According to Ref. [85], H(z) also satisfies a self-consistent condition of the form
H(z) = z ·D(H(z)). (4.5)
A random removal of a fraction 1 − p of nodes triggers a cascade of failures. When
no more nodes fail, network A reaches its final steady state. At this steady state, we use
the probabilistic approach [42] and define x to be the probability that a randomly chosen
connectivity link leads to the giant component at one of its ends. If we randomly choose a
connectivity link l and find an arbitrary node n by following l in an arbitrary direction, the
probability that node n has degree k is
kP (k)∑
k kP (k)
=
kP (k)
〈k〉 . (4.6)
For node n, the root of a directed cluster of size s, to be part of the giant component, at least
one of its other k− 1 out-going connectivity links (other than the link first chosen) leads to
the giant component, provided that every other s − 1 node is also in the giant component
because the disconnection of any one of these s − 1 nodes to the giant component will
cause node n to lose support and fail. Computing this probability, we can write out the
self-consistent equation for x as
x = p{
∑
k
kP (k)
〈k〉 [1− (1− x)
k−1]} ·
∑
s
{h(s){p
∑
k
P (k)[1− (1− x)k]}s−1}, (4.7)
where p is the probability that a node survives the initial removal process, 1− (1− x)k−1
is the probability that at least one of the other k − 1 connectivity links of node n leads to
the giant component, h(s) is the probability that node n is the root of a directed cluster of
size s, and {p∑k P (k)[1 − (1 − x)k]}s−1 is the probability that every other s − 1 node in
the directed cluster supporting node n is also in the giant component. Using the generating
functions defined in Eqs. (4.1), (4.2) and (4.4), we transform Eq. (4.2) into the compact
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form
x =
1−G1(1− x)
1−G0(1− x) ·H(p[1−G0(1− x)]). (4.8)
which, by viewing p[1 − G0(1 − x)] as a whole and using the property of H(z) outlined in
Eq. (4.5), can also be written as
x = p[1−G1(1− x)] ·D[H(p(1−G0(1− x))] ≡ F (x, p). (4.9)
For a given p, x can be numerically calculated through iteration with a proper initial value.
Correspondingly, using similar arguments, the probability P∞(p) that a randomly chosen
node n in the steady state of network A is in the giant component is
P∞(p) = p{
∑
k
P (k)[1− (1− x)k]} ·
∑
s
h(s){p
∑
k
P (k)[1− (1− x)k]}s−1
= H(p[1−G0(1− x)]), (4.10)
where 1 − (1 − x)k is the probability that at least one of the k connectivity links of node
n leads to the giant component. Note that P∞(p) is also the normalized size of the giant
component of network A at the steady state.
We find that there is no giant component at the steady state of network A, i.e., P∞(p) =
0 when p is smaller than a critical probability pIIc and above the threshold, the giant
component appears and its size increases continuously from 0 as p increases. This is typical
second-order phase transition behavior and as p→ pIIc , P∞(pIIc ) = H(pIIc [1−G0(1−x)])→
0, which suggests x → 0. Thus we can take the Taylor expansion of Eq. (4.9) with x → 0
to obtain pIIc as,
pIIc =
1
Q(0)G
′
1(1)
=
〈k〉
Q(0) 〈k(k − 1)〉 , (4.11)
which is consistent with our previous result reported in Ref. [83] and depends on Q(0) only
but not any other terms from Q(ko).
In some cases, however, there is no giant component at the steady state of network A,
i.e., P∞(p) = 0 when p is smaller than a critical probability pIc but above the threshold,
the giant component suddenly appears and its size increases abruptly from 0 as p increases.
This is typical first-order phase transition behavior. When p = pIc , the straight line y = x
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and the curve y = F (x, p) from Eq. (4.9) will tangentially touch each other at (xc, xc) [83].
Thus, the condition corresponding to the first-order transition is that the derivatives of
both sides of Eq. (4.9) with respect to x are equal,
1 =
dF (x, p)
dx
|x = xc, p = pIc . (4.12)
Due to the complexity of Eqs. (4.9) and (4.12), numeric methods are generally used to get
pIc .
Note pIc = p
II
c corresponds to the case where the phase transition changes from first-
order to second-order when the conditions for both the first- and second-order transitions
are satisfied simultaneously. By substituting pIIc from Eq. (4.11) into Eq. (4.12) and fur-
ther evaluating x, we obtain the boundary between the first-order and second-order phase
transitions, which is characterized by,
Q(1) =
Q(0)G
′′
1(1)
2G
′
0(1)
=
Q(0) 〈k(k − 1)(k − 2)〉
2 〈k〉2 . (4.13)
Thus, the boundary between first- and second-order transitions is determined only by the
proportion of nodes that do not depend on more than one node, i.e., the boundary is solely
determined by Q(0) and Q(1) but not any other terms from Q(ko). This implies that the
triple point – the intersection of first-order phase transition, second-order phase transition
and the unstable regime is also determined by Q(0) and Q(1).
When removing any fraction of nodes results in the total collapse of network A, i.e.,
when pIIc ≥ 1, the network is unstable. By requiring pIIc = 1 and using Eq. (4.11), we can
obtain the boundary between the second-order phase transition and the unstable state,
Q(0) =
1
G
′
1(1)
=
〈k〉
〈k(k − 1)〉 , (4.14)
which depends solely on the proportion of nodes that do not depend on other nodes at all,
i.e., Q(0).
Similarly, by requiring pIc = 1 in Eq. (4.12), we use numerical calculations to find the
boundary between the first-order phase transition and the unstable state. Therefore, the
complete boundary between the unstable state and the phase transition state is achieved
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by joining these two boundaries together. Moreover, substituting Eq. (4.13) into Eq. (4.14),
we could obtain the explicit formula of the triple point which is the intersection of these
two boundaries,
Q(1) =
〈k(k − 1)(k − 2)〉
2 〈k〉 〈k(k − 1)〉 . (4.15)
Note that for scale-free networks with power law degree distribution P (k) ∝ k−γ and
γ ∈ (2, 3], both 〈k(k − 1)〉 and 〈k(k − 1)(k − 2)〉 are divergent. This implies that pIIc = 0
for any Q(0) according to Eq. (4.11) and the regime of the second-order phase transition
shrinks towards the origin. Thus for scale-free networks, the situation becomes a little bit
simple. Therefore, if Q(0) > 0 one could always see the second-order phase transition with
pIIc = 0 and if Q(0) = 0 the system undergoes unstable or first-order phase transition.
4.3 Results on ER Networks
Section II provided the general framework for random networks with an arbitrary degree dis-
tribution P (k). We here illustrate it using an ER network [26, 27, 71] with a Poisson degree
distribution P (k) = e−〈k〉〈k〉k/k! where 〈k〉 is the average degree. We choose this network
because it is representative of random networks, and the generating function corresponding
to the degree distribution P (k) is G0(z) = e
〈k〉(z−1).
4.3.1 Second-order phase transitions
Plugging G
′
1(1) = 〈k〉 into Eq. (4.11), we get the second-order phase transition point pIIc ,
pIIc =
1
Q(0) 〈k〉 . (4.16)
Therefore, for ER networks, the critical point of second-order phase transition is indeed
determined solely by Q(0) and its average degree. We support our analytical results by
simulations. We choose 〈k〉 = 8 and D(z) = Q(0) + Q(1)z + Q(2)z2 with Q(0) fixed at
0.4 and Q(1), Q(2) tunable. Fig. 4.2 (a) shows the size of the giant component P∞(p)
as a function of p with the given 〈k〉 and D(z). Note that in all cases simulation results
(symbols) agree well with numerical results (dotted lines) and the curves of P∞(p) converge
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Figure 4.2: (a) The size of the giant component P∞(p), as a function of the fraction of
nodes that remain after random removal, p, for ER networks with 〈k〉 = 8 and D(z) =
Q(0) + Q(1)z + Q(2)z2. The symbols represent simulation results of 104 nodes and the
dashed lines show the theoretical predictions from Eq. (4.10). The percolation threshold
pIIc is uniquely determined by Q(0). (b) The size of the giant component P∞(p) as a function
of the fraction of nodes that remain after random removal, p, for ER networks. Here we
used D(z) = Q(0) + Q(1)z with 〈k〉 = 5 ( and ? ) and D(z) = Q(0) + Q(1)z + Q(2)z2
with 〈k〉 = 10 (© and O). The symbols represent simulation results of 104 nodes and the
dashed lines are the theoretical predictions from Eq. (4.10). With a relatively larger Q(0),
the network undergoes a second-order phase transition at pIIc , which only depends on Q(0).
However for relatively smaller Q(0) and larger Q(1) and Q(2), the network undergoes a
first-order phase transition.
at a fixed value of pIIc = 0.3125 as predicted by Eq. (4.16). This convergence of P∞(p) curves
is possible because pIIc is determined solely by Q(0), which is fixed to be 0.4 in Fig. 4.2 (a).
Note that if there is no directed dependency links in the network, i.e., Q(0) = 1, we will get
pIIc = 1/ 〈k〉, which is consistent with the well-known result obtained in Ref. [2].
4.3.2 First-order phase transitions
When networks have a greater proportion of directed dependency links, an abrupt transition
can occur instead of a continuous transition demonstrated in Fig. 4.2 (b). To get the pIc for
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the onset of this abrupt transition, we equate the derivatives of both sides of Eq. (4.9) with
respect to x, i.e.,
1 =
d{p(1− e−〈k〉x) ·D[H(p(1− e−〈k〉x)}
dx
|x=xc,p=pIc , (4.17)
where we used the equtions G0(z) = G1(z) = e
〈k〉(z−1). Using Eqs. (4.9) and (4.17), we
apply numerical methods to get pIc .
With D(z) = Q(0) +Q(1)z+Q(2)z2, Fig. 4.2 (b) shows the size of the giant component
P∞(p) as a function of p by comparing simulation results and theoretical predictions. Note
that they agree with each other very well. Fig. 4.2 (b) shows that with 〈k〉 = 5 and
Q(0) + Q(1) = 1, when Q(0) = 0.4, P∞(p) undergoes a second-order phase transition at
pIIc = 0.5 (), but when Q(0) = 0.2, P∞(p) exhibits behavior of a first-order phase transition
at pIc , satisfying Eq. (4.17) (F). In addition, when 〈k〉 = 10, Q(0) = 0.2, Q(1) = 0.7 and
Q(2) = 0.1, P∞(p) undergoes a second-order phase transition at pIIc = 0.5 (©), but when
Q(0) = 0.1, Q(1) = 0.8 and Q(2) = 0.1, P∞(p) undergoes a first-order phase transition at
pIc predicted by Eq. (4.17) (O).
4.3.3 Boundaries of phase diagram
We fix the average degree 〈k〉 and from Eq. (4.16) we conclude that the smaller Q(0)
in the network, the bigger the pIIc value. If Q(0) is properly small that p
II
c ≈ 1, which
corresponds to the case in which the removal of any fraction of nodes causes a second-order
phase transition that totally disintegrates network A. Thus, by requiring pIIc = 1, and
using Eq. (4.16) we obtain the boundary between the second-order phase transition and the
unstable state,
1
〈k〉Q(0) = 1. (4.18)
In addition, using Eq. (4.13), we obtain the boundary between the first-order and second-
order phase transitions of network A,
Q(1) =
〈k〉Q(0)
2
. (4.19)
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Figure 4.3: (a) Comparison between simulation (symbols) and theory (lines) for P∞(pc)
as a function of Q(1) for different D(z) (D(z) = Q(0) + Q(1)z + Q(2)z2 + Q(3)z3) while
keeping Q(0) + Q(1) = 0.9 and 〈k〉 = 10. At the first-order phase transition point pIc ,
P∞(pc) is nonzero; whereas at the second-order phase transition point pIIc and P∞(pc) is
zero. From Eq. (4.19) the boundary between first-order phase transition and second-order
phase transition is only dependent on Q(0) + Q(1), thus at Q(1)c = 0.75 for this case.
(b) The fraction of nodes that have one dependent node Q(1) as a function of the average
degree 〈k〉 with Q(0) + Q(1) = 910 . The dashed lines are theoretical results obtained from
Eqs. (4.20) (green) and (4.21) (red) with an intersection point at ( 22M−1 ,
1
2). The dashed
blue line is the boundary between first-order phase transition and unstable system, obtained
numerically. Here the dashed red and green lines only depend on M whereas the blue lines
(both solid and dashed) depend on the specific details of Q(ko) other than M .
Using D(z) = Q(0) +Q(1)z +Q(2)z2 +Q(3)z3 where Q(0) +Q(1) = 0.9 and 〈k〉 = 10,
Fig. 4.3 (a) plots P∞(pc) as a function of Q(1) by comparing simulation and numerical
results. The critical value of Q(1)c falls onto Q(1)c = 0.75 as predicted by Eq. (4.19),
delimiting two different transition regimes. Specifically, if Q(1) < 0.75, P∞(pc) = 0, which
indicates the presence of a second-order phase transition, but if Q(1) > 0.75, P∞(pc) > 0,
which indicates the presence of a first-order phase transition.
We also consider a special case in whichQ(0)+Q(1) = M and use Eq. (4.19) to determine
60
the boundary between the first-order phase transition and the second-order phase transition,
Q(1) =
M 〈k〉
〈k〉+ 2 . (4.20)
In addition, in terms of M , Eq. (4.18) delivers the boundary between the second-order phase
transition and unstable state,
Q(1) =
M 〈k〉 − 1
〈k〉 . (4.21)
Thus, in the coordinate system of 〈k〉-Q(1), using Eqs. (4.20) and (4.21) we can plot the
phase diagram of network A under random failures, with these two boundaries converging
at the triple point ( 22M−1 ,
1
2) (the solid red dot in Fig. 4.3 (b)). Because 〈k〉 > 0 always
holds, when M ≤ 12 this intersection point is non-physical, indicating that the network will
not be subject to first-order phase transitions under attack irregardless of the form of P (k),
but if M > 12 , the network will be subject to first-order phase transitions.
Fig. 4.3 (b) shows the boundaries in the phase diagram with M = 910 >
1
2 , where
the boundaries between first-order phase transitions and the unstable state are determined
numerically. Note that, when M is fixed, the boundary between the second-order phase
transition and the unstable state (dashed red line) as well as the boundary between the
first-order and second-order phase transitions (dashed green line) are also fixed because
they depend only on M , but the boundary between the first-order phase transition and
the unstable state (dashed blue line) is subject to the details of Q(ko). For example, when
Q(0) +Q(1) = 910 , a shuffle of the remaining terms in Q(ko) causes a shift in the boundary
line, shown as the displacement of the solid blue line to the dashed blue line in Fig. 4.3(b).
4.4 Summary
In summary, we present an analytical formalism for studying random networks with both
connectivity links and directed dependency links under random node failures. Using a prob-
abilistic approach, we find that the directed dependency links greatly reduce the robustness
of a network. We show that the system disintegrates in a form of second-order phase tran-
sition at a critical threshold and the boundary between second-order phase transition and
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unstable regimes solely determined by the proportion of nodes that do not depend on other
nodes. Our framework also provides the solution for the boundary between the first-order
and second-order phase transitions, which is characterized by the proportion of nodes that
depend on no more than one node.
Chapter 5
Eradicating Catastrophic Collapse in
Interdependent Networks via Reinforced
Nodes
5.1 Introduction
Complex networks often interact and depend on each other to function properly [10, 13, 15,
51, 86–88]. Due to interdependencies, these interacting networks may easily suffer abrupt
failures and face catastrophic consequences, such as the blackouts of Italy in 2003 and North
America in 2008 [10, 15, 51]. Thus, a major open challenge arises as how to tackle the
vulnerability of interdependent networks. Virtually many existing theories on the resilience
of interacting networks have centered on the formation of the largest cluster (called the
giant component) [2, 10, 15, 21, 46, 58, 60, 89, 90], and consider only the nodes in the giant
component as functional, since all the small clusters do not have a connection to the majority
of nodes, which are in the giant component.
However, in many realistic networks, in case of network component failures, some nodes
(which we call here reinforced nodes), and even clusters containing reinforced nodes outside
of the giant component, can resort to contingency mechanisms or back-up facilities to keep
themselves functioning normally [91–93]. For example, small neighborhoods in a city when
facing a sudden power outage could employ alternative facilities to sustain themselves.
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Consider also the case where some important internet ports, after their fiber links are
cut off from the giant component, could use satellites [94] or high-altitude platforms [95]
to exchange vital information. These possibilities strongly motivate us to generalize the
percolation theory [89, 96] to include a fraction of reinforced nodes that are capable of
securing the functioning of the finite clusters in which they are located. We apply this
framework to study a system of interdependent networks and find that a small fraction of
reinforced nodes can avoid the catastrophic abrupt collapse.
In this paper we develop a mathematical framework based on percolation [2, 10, 15, 58,
97] for studying interdependent networks with reinforced nodes and find exact solutions
to the minimal fraction of reinforced nodes needed to eradicate catastrophic collapses. In
particular we apply our framework to study and compare three types of random networks,
(i) ER networks with a Poisson degree distribution (P (k) = e−〈k〉〈k〉k/k!) [71], (ii) SF
networks with a power law degree distribution (P (k) ∼ k−λ) [5], and (iii) RR networks
with a Kronecker delta degree distribution (P (k) = δk,k0). Here k stands for the number of
connections of a single node. We find the universal upper bound for this minimal fraction
to be 0.1756 for two interdependent ER networks with any average degree and SF and RR
networks with a large average degree.
5.2 The Model
Formally, for simplicity and without loss of generality, our model consists of two networks
A and B with N nodes in each network (see Fig. 5.1). Within network A the nodes are
randomly connected by A links with degree distribution PA(k), while in network B the
nodes are randomly connected by B links with degree distribution PB(k). In addition, a
fraction qA of nodes in A are randomly dependent (through dependency links) on nodes
in network B and a fraction qB of nodes in network B are randomly dependent on nodes
in network A [11]. We also assume that a node from one network depends on no more
than one node from the other network and if a node i in network A is dependent on a
node j in network B and j depends on a node l in network A, then l = i (a no-feedback
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Figure 5.1: Demonstration of the model studied here where two interdependent networks
A and B have gone through cascading failures and reached a steady state. The yellow
arrows represent a fraction qA(B) of nodes from network A(B) depending on nodes from
network B(A) for critical support. Reinforced nodes α and β (purple circles) are nodes that
survive and also support their clusters even if the clusters are not connected to the largest
component. Some regular nodes (green circles) survive the cascading failures whereas some
other regular nodes (red circles) fail. Note that the clusters of circles in the shaded purple
areas constitute the functioning component studied in our model.
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condition [10, 15, 78, 81]). We denote ρA and ρB as the fractions of nodes that are randomly
chosen as reinforced nodes in network A and network B, respectively. In each network,
together with the giant component, those smaller clusters containing at least one reinforced
node make up the functioning component, as shown in Fig. 5.1. The failure process is
initiated by removing randomly a fraction 1 − p of nodes from each network. Therefore
when nodes from one network fail their dependent counterparts from the other network
must also fail. In this case, an autonomous node (a node that does not need support from
the other network) [11] survives if it is connected to a functioning component of its own
network; a dependent node n0 survives if both n0 and the node it depends on are connected
to their own networks’ functioning components.
We introduce the generating function of the degree distribution GA0(x) =
∑
k PA(k)x
k
and the associated branching processes GA1(x) = G
′
A0(x)/G
′
A0(1) [46] where G
′
A0(x) =∑
k kPA(k)x
k−1; similar equations exist to describe network B. At the steady state, using
the probabilistic framework [42–45, 47, 98, 99], we denote x (y) as the probability that a
randomly chosen link in network A (B) reaches the functioning component of network A
(B) at one of its nodes. Thus x and y satisfy the following self-consistent equations
x = p [1− (1− ρA)GA1(1− x)] {1− qA + pqA [1− (1− ρB)GB0(1− y)]} , (5.1)
and
y = p [1− (1− ρB)GB1(1− y)] {1− qB + pqB [1− (1− ρA)GA0(1− x)]} . (5.2)
These two equations can be transformed into x = F1(p, y) and y = F2(p, x), which can be
solved numerically by iteration with the proper initial values of x and y.
Accordingly, the sizes of the functioning components are determined by
PA∞ = p[1− (1− ρA)GA0(1− x)] {1− qA + pqA[1− (1− ρB)GB0(1− y)]} , (5.3)
and
PB∞ = p[1− (1− ρB)GB0(1− y)] {1− qB + pqB[1− (1− ρA)GA0(1− x)]} . (5.4)
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If the system has an abrupt phase transition at p = pIc , the functions x = F1(p, y) and
y = F2(p, x) satisfy the condition
∂F1(p
I
c , y
I)
∂yI
· ∂F2(p
I
c , x
I)
∂xI
= 1, (5.5)
namely, the curves x = F1(p
I
c , y) and y = F2(p
I
c , x) touch each other tangentially at (x
I , yI)
[16, 42].
5.3 Results
For a general system of interdependent networks A and B, PA∞, PB∞ and the existence of pIc
can be easily determined numerically, using Eqs. (5.1)-(5.5). As an example, Fig. 5.2 shows
the excellent agreement between simulation and theory.
However it is important to find analytic expressions for PA∞, PB∞ and pIc , at least for
simpler cases, that can serve as a benchmark to better understand simulated solutions
of more realistic cases. Thus here, for simplicity, we consider the symmetric case where
PA(k) = PB(k), ρA = ρB = ρ and qA = qB = q. This symmetry readily implies that
x = y ≡ F (p, x), reducing Eqs. (5.1) and (5.2) to a single equation. Similarly, it renders
PA∞ = PB∞ ≡ P∞ and transforms Eq. (5.5) to ∂F (p
I
c ,x
I)
∂xI
· dxI
dxI
= 1, i.e., ∂F (p
I
c ,x
I)
∂xI
= 1. Using
Eqs. (5.1)-(5.5), we derive pIc and P∞ rigorously.
Surprisingly, we find that even for a system built with a relatively high dependency
coupling there exists a specific value ρ∗ that divides the phase diagram into two regimes.
Specifically, if ρ ≤ ρ∗, the system is subject to abrupt transitions; however, if ρ > ρ∗,
the abrupt percolation transition is absent in the system because the giant component
changes from a first-order phase transition behavior to a second-order phase transition
behavior.Therefore ρ∗ is the minimum fraction of nodes in each network that need to be
reinforced in order to make the interdependent system less risky and free from abrupt
transitions. Moreover, ρ∗ satisfies the condition
dpIc
dxI
|ρ=ρ∗ = 0. (5.6)
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Figure 5.2: The sizes of functioning components as a function of p for ER networks with
ρA = 0.05, ρB = 0.03, qA = 0.65, qB = 0.95, 〈k〉A = 4, and 〈k〉B = 5. The simulation results
(symbols) are obtained from two networks of 105 nodes and are in good agreement with
the theoretical results (solid lines), Eqs. (5.3) and (5.4). Note that for ρA 6= 0 and ρB 6= 0,
network A(B) always has at least a fraction p2ρAρBqA (p
2ρAρBqB) of nodes functioning
after a fraction 1− p of nodes are removed from both networks.
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Figure 5.3 shows the existence of ρ∗ for systems of fully interdependent ER networks (ρ∗ ≈
0.1756) and scale-free (SF) networks (ρ∗ ≈ 0.0863), respectively. Figs. 5.3A and 5.3B depict
the dramatic behavior change of the functioning components as ρ increases slightly from
under ρ∗ to above ρ∗. Fig. 5.3C shows that pIc slowly decreases as ρ approaches ρ∗ and
ceases to exist for ρ > ρ∗. We can also see in Fig. 5.3D that the jump of the functioning
component 4P∞ at pIc decreases to zero as ρ increases from zero to ρ∗.
We next solve this critical value ρ∗ as a function of q and 〈k〉 for two interdependent
ER networks as
ρ∗ = 1− exp
{
1
2
[
1− 〈k〉 (1− q)2/2q]}
2−√〈k〉 (1− q)2/2q , (5.7)
where q0 ≤ q ≤ 1 and q0 is the minimum strength of interdependence required to abruptly
collapse the system [14]. If we set ρ∗ = 0 in Eq. (5.7), q0 can be obtained from 〈k〉 (1− q0)2/2q0 =
1 as q0 =
(
1 + 〈k〉 −√2 〈k〉+ 1) /〈k〉, as found in Refs. [16, 72]. Applying Taylor expansion
to Eq. (5.7) for q → q0, we get the critical exponent β1, defined via ρ∗ ∼ (q − q0)β1 with
β1 = 3.
Hence for any q ∈ [q0, 1] we first calculate ρ∗ using Eq. (5.7) then pIc corresponding to
this q and ρ∗ can be computed as
pIc(q, ρ
∗) =
[
2− (1− q)
√
〈k〉/2q
]
/
√
2 〈k〉 q, (5.8)
and the size of the functioning component at this pIc is
P∞(pIc) = [1− 〈k〉 (1− q)2/2q]/2 〈k〉. (5.9)
The behavior of the order parameter P∞(p) near the critical point is defined by the critical
exponent β2, where P∞(p)−P∞(pIc) ∼ (p−pIc)β2 with β2 = 1/3 if ρ = ρ∗ and β2 = 1/2 if ρ <
ρ∗ (see Ref. [11]). Similar scaling behaviors have been reported in a bootstrap percolation
problem [45] and in a Fredrickson-Andersen model on Bethe lattice with quenched impurities
[100].
In Fig. 5.4A we plot ρ∗ from Eq. (5.7) as a function q for several different values of 〈k〉.
Interestingly, at q = 1, namely, for two fully interdependent ER networks, we find, for all
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Figure 5.3: Percolation properties of symmetric interdependent ER and SF networks.
(A),(B) Demonstration of the behavior of P∞ around ρ∗ for (A) ER networks with 〈k〉 = 4,
q = 1 and (B) SF networks with P (k) ∼ k−λ, λ = 2.7, kmin = 2, kmax = 2048 and q = 1.
(C ),(D) The abrupt collapse point pIc (thick black line) and the jump of the functioning
component 4P∞ (thin black line) at pIc as a function of ρ for (C ) ER and (D) SF networks.
We find ρ∗ for both cases as highlighted in the graphs.
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Figure 5.4: (A) ρ∗ as a function of q for symmetric ER networks with different values of 〈k〉.
The results are obtained using Eq. (5.7) and these curves converge at the point (1, 0.1756).
(B) ρ∗ as a function of q for symmetric SF networks with kmin = 2 and different values of λ.
The results are obtained from numerical calculations (Eq. (30) in the appendix. We always
have ρ∗max at q = 1 corresponding to the fully interdependent scenario.
mean degrees, the maximum of ρ∗ to be
ρ∗max = 1− e1/2/2 ≈ 0.1756, (5.10)
which is independent of 〈k〉. In Fig. 5.4B we plot ρ∗ as a function of q for several degree
exponents λ of SF networks. Here ρ∗ increases as λ increases and takes its maximum ρ∗max
at q = 1, corresponding to the fully interdependent case, which is the most vulnerable.
Thus if the dependency strength q is unknown, ρ∗max is the minimal fraction of reinforced
nodes, that can prevent catastrophic collapse.
Similarly, we obtain ρ∗max as a function of the degree exponent λ for two fully interdepen-
dent SF networks (see Fig. 5.5A) and ρ∗max as a function of k0 for two fully interdependent
RR networks (see Fig. 5.5B). Note that as λ increases, ρ∗max initially increases but later sta-
bilizes at a value determined by kmin as the degree distribution becomes more homogeneous
and its network structure becomes the same as that in an RR network with k0 = kmin, Sec-
tion 3.2). For RR networks, as k0 increases, ρ
∗
max initially decreases but later stabilizes at
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Figure 5.5: (A) ρ∗max as a function of λ for two fully interdependent SF networks with the
same number of nodes and degree exponent and kmin = 2 (circle), 5 (diamond) and 20
(triangle); ρ∗max has an upper limit of 0.282 (circle), 0.201 (diamond) and 0.181 (triangle)
as λ→∞. (B) ρ∗max as a function of k0 for two fully interdependent RR networks with the
same number of nodes and k0; ρ
∗
max approaches 0.1756 as k0 →∞.
a value close to 0.1756, since at very large k0 the structure of these RR networks resembles
that of ER networks with 〈k〉 = k0.
Next we solve ρ∗max of two fully interdependent networks as a function of α, where
α = 〈k〉A/〈k〉B. We find that in two ER networks, as α increases, ρ∗max increases and has
a maximum at α = 1, corresponding to the symmetric case studied above. In the case
of RR networks with large k0, ρ
∗
max behaves similarly to its counterpart in ER networks,
peaking around α = 1 at 0.1756 (see Fig. 5.5B). Moreover, in the case of SF networks when
λ ∈ (2, 3], ρ∗max ≤ 0.11; whereas when λ and kmin are relatively large, ρ∗max will also peak
around α = 1 with a value close to that obtained in RR networks. Therefore in the extreme
case where λ and kmin are large, SF networks converge to RR networks with k0 = kmin,
which further converge to ER networks with 〈k〉 = k0. Thus in these extreme cases there
exists a universal ρ∗max equal to 0.1756.
Our approach can be generalized to solve the case of tree-like networks of networks
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Figure 5.6: Percolation transition in real-world systems with the introduction of reinforced
nodes. (A) The circles, squares and triangles represent simulation results of a system
composed of the US power grid (PG, with N = 4941, 〈k〉 = 2.699) and an ER network (N =
4941, 〈k〉 = 2.699) with interdependence strength q = 0.65 and ρ = 0, 0.02, 0.05 respectively;
(B) The circles, squares and triangles represent simulation results of a system composed
of the same PG and an SF network (N = 4941, λ = 2.7, kmin = 2) with interdependence
q = 0.65 and ρ = 0, 0.01, 0.02 respectively. The symbols are results obtained from a single
realization.
(NON) [15, 99]. For example, we study the symmetric case of an ER NON with n fully
interdependent member networks and obtain
ρ∗max = 1− e1−1/n/n, (5.11)
which is independent of the average degree 〈k〉.This relationship indicates that the bigger
n is, the larger ρ∗max should be, which is consistent with the previous finding that the more
networks an NON has, the more vulnerable it will be [15].
5.4 Test on Empirical Data
We next test our mathematical framework on an empirical network, the US power grid (PG)
[23], with the introduction of a small fraction of reinforced nodes. It is difficult to establish
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the exact structure of the network, that PG interacts with, and their interdependencies
due to lack of data. However, to get qualitative insight into the problem we couple the PG
with either ER or SF networks which can be regarded as approximations to many real-world
networks. Our motivation is to test how our model performs in the interdependent networks
system with some real-world network features. Note that here, our results present cascading
failures due to structural failures and do not represent failures due to real dynamics, such as
cascading failures due to overloads, that appear in power grid network system. Figure 5.6
compares the mutual percolation of two systems of interdependent networks with the same
interdependence strength: PG coupled to a same sized ER network (Fig. 5.6A) and PG
coupled to a same sized SF network (Fig. 5.6B). As discussed above, for ρ below a certain
critical value ρ∗ the systems will undergo abrupt transitions, whereas for ρ above ρ∗ the
systems do not undergo any transition at all. We also find that, for the interdependence
strength q = 0.65 shown here, the ρ∗ value of the latter case is very small and close to 0.02
(Fig. 5.6B).
5.5 Summary
In summary, we have developed a general percolation framework for studying interdepen-
dent networks by introducing a fraction of reinforced nodes at random. We show that the
introduction of a relatively small fraction of reinforced nodes, ρ∗, can avoid abrupt collapse
and thus enhance its robustness. By comparing ρ∗ in ER, SF and RR networks, we reveal
the close relationship between these network structures in extreme cases and find the uni-
versal upper bound for ρ∗ to be 0.1756. We also observe improved robustness in systems
with some real-world network structure features. The framework presented here might offer
some useful suggestions on how to design robust interdependent networks.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
This dissertation is a comprehensive review of the original research conducted by me to-
gether with my collaborators during my doctoral studies at the Physics Department of
Boston University. My research concentrates on studying the robustness of complex net-
works under various types of attacks using the tool of percolation theory developed in
statistical physics. As science and technology develops, the world is becoming intensely
inter-connected and various complex networks form during this process. With the avail-
ability of large-scale data, complex networks are revealed to exist in almost every aspect of
our life. Moreover, networks in nature or artificial systems exhibit inter-dependency to a
large degree. The danger of it is that failure in one system will be exponentially spread into
other systems and causes catastrophic repercussions. Thus, understanding the robustness
of complex networks under attack is crucial for protecting complex systems and designing
resilient infrastructure systems. Network resilience is crucially dependent on the structure
of networks and the nature of attacks. This dissertation covers two major parts of my
research: i) systematically study network robustness of networks with tunable degree dis-
tributions or directed dependency links under random, localized or targeted attacks in the
context of both traditional percolation and k-core percolations; ii) develop and propose a
reinforcement scheme to eradicate catastrophic collapses in interdependent networks.
In Chapter 2, we systematically study how the breadth of degree distribution influences
network robustness by comparing random and localized attacks in the ordinary percolation.
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For random attack, each node in the network is attacked and removed with the same
probability. While for localized attack, the probability for each node to be attacked is
dependent upon the its location with respect to the root removal node. To better understand
the effect of the breath of the degree distribution we study two models in which the breadth
is controlled and compare their robustness against localized attaches and random attacks.
We study analytically and by numerical simulations where the degrees in the networks
follow a bi-Poisson distribution P (k) = αe−λ1 λ
k
1
k! + (1−α)e−λ2
λk2
k! , α ∈ [0, 1], and a Gaussian
distribution P (k) = A · exp(− (k−µ)2
2σ2
) with a normalization constant A where k ≥ 0. In the
bi-Poisson distribution the breadth is controlled by the values of α, λ1, and λ2, while in the
Gaussian distribution it is controlled by the standard deviation, σ. We find that only when
α = 0 or α = 1, i.e., degrees obeying a pure Poisson distribution, are LA and RA the same.
In all other cases networks are more vulnerable under LA than under RA. For a Gaussian
distribution with an average degree µ fixed, we find that when σ2 is smaller than µ the
network is more vulnerable against random attack. When σ2 is larger than µ, however, the
network becomes more vulnerable against localized attack. Similar qualitative results are
also shown for interdependent networks.
In Chapter 3, we present a theoretical framework to study the dynamics of k-core
percolation in both single and interdependent networks. k-core percolation is a natural
generalization of traditional percolation theory in which the object of interest is the largest
subgraph of a network where each node has at least a threshold degree of k. After an initial
attack, due to k-core percolation, the network disintegrate in an iterative pruning process
that will finally yield the steady largest subgraph, called the giant k-core. When a network
is attacked and nodes become disconnected from the giant connected component, the type
of attack strongly influences how much percolation-driven damage will occur. We study the
stability of networks under random attack (RA), localized attack (LA) and targeted attack
(TA) and compare analytical results with numerical simulations of k-core percolation. We
map a network under LA or TA on an equivalent network under RA and find that in both
single and interdependent networks TA causes the greatest damage to the core structure of
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the network. We also find that LA and RA cause equal damage to the core structure in
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) networks, but that LA causes much more damage than RA to the core
structure in scale-free (SF) networks.
In Chapter 4, we present a probabilistic method to study the robustness of complex
networks with directed dependency links. The self-consistent probabilistic approach has
proven itself powerful in studying the percolation behavior of interdependent or multiplex
networks without tracking the percolation process through each cascading step. The pres-
ence of directed-dependency links arise from the imbalance of the dependency between
nodes in a network. The presence of those links will dramatically change the robustness
of a network as an initial failure can trigger a synergy of two processes: the percolation
process and the dependency process, which will fragment a network in an unprecedented
way. In order to understand how directed dependency links impact criticality, we employ
this approach to study the percolation properties of networks with both undirected connec-
tivity links and directed dependency links. We find that when a random network with a
given degree distribution undergoes a second-order phase transition, the critical point and
the unstable regime surrounding the second-order phase transition regime are determined
by the proportion of nodes that do not depend on any other nodes. Moreover, we also
find that the triple point and the boundary between first- and second-order transitions are
determined by the proportion of nodes that depend on no more than one node. This implies
that it is maybe general for multiplex network systems, some important properties of phase
transitions can be determined only by a few parameters. We illustrate our findings using
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) networks.
In Chapter 5, we introduce a reinforcement mechanism to eradicate the catastrophic col-
lapses in inter dependent networks. Modern infrastructure systems exhibit inter-dependency
to a large degree and a failure in one part of such a system can spread out recursively to the
whole system and bring down the system in an abrupt fashion. In interdependent networks,
it is usually assumed, based on percolation theory, that nodes become nonfunctional if they
lose connection to the network giant component. However, in reality, some nodes, equipped
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with alternative resources, together with their connected neighbors can still be functioning
once disconnected from the giant component. We propose and study a generalized perco-
lation model that introduces a fraction of reinforced nodes in the interdependent networks
that can function and support their neighborhood. We analyze, both analytically and via
simulations, the order parameter −the functioning component−comprising both the giant
component and smaller components that include at least one reinforced node. Remarkably,
it is found that for interdependent networks, we need to reinforce only a small fraction
of nodes to prevent abrupt catastrophic collapses. Moreover, we find that the universal
upper bound of this fraction is 0.1756 for two interdependent Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) networks,
regular-random (RR) networks and scale-free (SF) networks with large average degrees. We
also generalize our theory to interdependent networks of networks (NON). These findings
might yield insight for designing resilient interdependent infrastructure networks.
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